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Note to the Reader 
Throughout this thesis I have used the pronoun ‘we’ instead of ‘I’.  The work here is my 
own in terms of hypotheses, analyses and conclusions, but it is effectively the product of 







1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
What then is time?  If no one asks me, I know.  If I wish to 
explain it to him who asks, I know not. 
Saint Augustine, Confessions 
 
Time is a fundamental category that is pervasive in all our thinking.  It is expressed 
in language when we refer to things that happened just some seconds ago, things that 
are about to happen next year or literally at any point in the eternal flow of time.  
Temporal awareness generates desires, and it shapes our behavior, e.g. when we seek to 
keep souvenirs of specific moments to preserve the fugacious past for the future.  We try 
to prepare for the near and distant future when we scribble to-do-lists, design building 
plans or formulate our last will.  On the individual level memory for the past and images 
of the future are essential for the conception and the development of personality (e.g. 
Singer & Salovey, 1993).  On the collective level the transmission of traditions, past 
experiences and inventions, over generations creates history and identity of diverse 
human communities; it forms the basis of human cultural evolution (Tomasello 1999).  
Compared to other species human temporal cognition is impressively flexible - and 
possibly unique (e.g. Clayton, Russell, & Dickinson, 2009; Roberts & Feeney, 2009; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), but it is also an ability of high complexity that shows up in 
many different forms and facets of human cognition.  In the famous quote above, Saint 
Augustine expresses the problem to capture the concept of time in simple words. It is just 
as well not trivial to answer the question of what exactly human temporal cognition is 
and what cognitive resources it is relying on.  The aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
emergence of specific aspects of temporal cognition in childhood in order to gain deeper 
insight into the embedding and the relation of temporal cognition with other, overlapping 
abilities that do not relate to the temporal domain at first glance.  In the first sections 
characteristics of temporal cognition and their early manifestations in children will be 
presented.  In section 1.3, three aspects of temporal cognition which are important for 





studies conducted to test children’s competence in these aspects will be presented and 
discussed in chapter 3. 
[…] die Zeit ist ein wesentliches Problem. Ich denke, dass wir 
nicht von der Zeit absehen können. Unser Bewusstsein 
bewegt sich unaufhörlich aus einem Zustand in den anderen, 
und dies ist die Zeit: die Abfolge.“  
Jorge Luis Borges, Die letzte Reise des Odysseus (1992) 
 
As Borges puts it the essential characteristic of time perception is the perception 
of sequence; an impression perceived by any sense can neglect spatial reference, but it 
will always be associated with its occurrence relative to other impressions.  Perceptually, 
single events or impressions take place at specific points on an imaginary timeline and 
they are interrelated in different ways.  The relation that anchors one event with another 
is essential, as it determines the event’s location on the timeline: if no such temporal 
connection would be possible, than a single event (or an impression) could not be 
represented as real.  It would be separated from real-world experiences, e.g. as a piece of 
the imagination, and independent from the timeline.  Important ingredients of our 
conception of time are, therefore, the conceptions of objective reality and 
interrelatedness of events in the real world (Bieri, 1986).  Parts of this reality are 
diachronically existing entities, e.g. objects that are permanent over time, and also 
temporally restricted entities like events and actions. 
But what is the nature of the interrelations between these entities?  Things in the 
real world change over time and events occur as a consequence of preceding events.  
That is, every representation of an object or an event elicits causal connections to 
“earlier” or “later” states in the flow of time.  But the kinds of connections can be 
manifold according to the type of event.  For example, actions of intentional agents are 
normatively related with each other in the sense that an action (e.g. a communicative act 
like the verbal utterance “It is cold in here.”) can evoke, or even call for, a set of 
normatively adequate possible reactions (e.g. a verbal response like “Yes, I feel the 
same”, the action of closing a window, etc.) (Searle, 1969, 1998).  Representing one of 





these actions as a communicative act means representing anterior and posterior events 
as well, which are parts of the action’s communicative context.  Someone witnessing only 
the first action is likely to expect a reaction to follow, whereas witnessing only the second 
action might generate assumptions on preceding actions.  Similar to these normative 
connections, the picture of a broken mug might elicit the causal connection to another 
state where the mug is still intact. Knowledge about cause-effect relations determines the 
expected temporal direction of the mug’s states, with the intact state being very likely to 
be temporally prior to the state where it is broken (Kutach, 2011; Le Poidevin, 2007).  
Taken together, our mature conception of time entails the representation of events as 
occurring in a temporal sequence.  The structure of this sequence is determined by the 
connections between events, which are mainly causal in nature, but they can also rely on 
normative relationships.  
Another important component necessary for temporal cognition is the conception 
of a temporally extended self (Moore & Lemmon, 2001; Nelson, 2001).  This means, in 
addition to representing objective facts like temporally restricted events and permanent 
objects and their causal connections in the world, it is necessary to represent the self as 
causally involved and continuously existing in this world (Bieri, 1986).  Without such self-
representation the succession of events in time could not be represented from an 
external viewpoint.  Instead temporal relations could only be represented as abstract 
distances between one another.  This external viewpoint is a second level of 
representation, often referred to as meta-representation (Bieri, 1986; Perner, Brandl, & 
Garnham, 2003).  Crucially, with time “passing by” the self is changing perspective 
constantly and consequently its representation of representations changes.  This means 
that representations of objective facts, e.g. ‘I see the mug falling down the table’, are 
formed at specific points in time (e.g. simultaneously with, or directly after the unfolding 
of the event).  In contrast to the real event, the subjective representation persists over 
time as part of the identity of the self.  With time elapsing, only temporal markers of 
representations are added and changed as a process of embedding representations into 
representations, e.g. ‘I remember seeing the mug falling down the table’.  This form of 
meta-representation allows for unlimited recursion in our event representations (see 





In conclusion two major prerequisites for the human perception of time are (i) the 
conception of time as a causally structured sequence of events, and (ii) the conception of 
a continuously existing, or temporally extended self.  In the following section evidence for 
the early possession of these conceptions will be examined with the focus on important 
abilities that are expected to emerge with the development of temporal cognition. 
1.2.1 Remembering the past 
Children around age four start to identify with their past selves in the present and 
show delayed self-recognition (Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996; Zelazo, Sommerville, 
& Nichols, 1999).  It is around the same time when they begin to remember specific 
events of their individual past and represent them as their own experiences, i.e. when 
they form autobiographical memories (Nelson, 1993; Perner & Ruffman, 1995).  This 
specific kind of memory for events as personally experienced was termed “episodic 
memory” in distinction to “semantic memory” by Tulving (1972).  The difference between 
episodic and semantic memory is often exemplified by the difference in “remembering” 
specific events as opposed to “knowing” certain facts (see, e.g., McCormack, 2001; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  A major characteristic of episodic memory is its 
embedded autobiographic (or “autonoetic”) component, which allows for a recursive 
structure in the sense of remembering something by representing the experience as an 
original experience of the past self (Perner, 1991, 2000, 2001; Tulving, 1985).  A 
description by Corballis emphasizes the role of recursion and its significance for the 
developing conception of a temporally extended self: 
Autonoetic awareness, then, is recursive, in that one can insert previous personal 
experience into present awareness. This is analogous to the embedding of phrases 
within phrases, or sentences within sentences. Deeper levels of embedding are 
also possible, as when I remember yesterday that I had remembered an event that 
occurred at some earlier time.  (Corballis, 2011, p. 85) 
Besides the theoretical possibility of representing an infinite number of past 
representations, empirical evidence suggests that with four years, children are at least 
able to identify with their past self (when shown a photo or a video) and they can link that 
past event with the present (e.g. when checking one’s body for a sticker that the photo 





shows to be sticking there) (Povinelli, 2001).  Moreover, children of this age begin to 
reason systematically about the temporal-causal relations of past events, e.g. when 
inferring current consequences from the order of two events they recently experienced 
(McColgan & McCormack, 2008; McCormack & Hanley, 2011; McCormack & Hoerl, 2007; 
Povinelli, Landry, Theall, Clark, & Castille, 1999).  This suggests that young children 
appreciate the fact that the order of past events is causally significant for present states 
of the world.  Still, it is unclear how much information about the particular temporal 
locations of past events children represent when engaging in this kind of tasks 
(McCormack & Hoerl, 1999). 
1.2.2 Planning for the future 
Advanced temporal cognition allows humans to foresee future desires in order to 
act in the present and prepare for future states of the self (Bischof-Köhler, 2000; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  Such future-oriented behavior requires at least two 
capacities: (i) the capacity to inhibit salient current desires and (ii) the capacity to engage 
in “self-projection” to the future (McCormack & Atance, 2011).  The first part of 
requirements has been tested in various adaptations of the classical “delay of 
gratification” paradigm (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989).  In these tasks children are 
asked to choose between receiving either a less desired reward immediately or receiving 
a larger or more desirable reward later in time.  Beginning with four years, and with 
increasing competence in the following years, children are able to inhibit their present 
desire for the smaller reward in favor of the larger future reward (e.g. Lemmon & Moore, 
2001; Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 1997) and even young children are sensitive to the 
length of the expected delay (Garon, Johnson, & Steeves, 2011).  Self-projection into the 
future, which is the second part necessary for flexible future planning, closely resembles 
what was described earlier as episodic memory in the past context.  In the future context 
the ability to mentally project oneself to (and imagine the self at) temporally distant 
events has been termed “episodic future thinking” or “episodic foresight” (Atance & 
O'Neill, 2001; Suddendorf & Moore, 2011). 
A variety of experimental tasks has been designed to test children’s ability to 





O'Neill, 2001, p. 537; see Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013 for a review).  Results indicate, 
again, that children around the age of four are able to save resources for a future need 
(Metcalf & Atance, 2011).  Furthermore, they are likely to foresee what they themselves 
or another person will need in the near future and organize resources in the present to 
meet these anticipated needs (Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & 
von Gehlen, 2011).  Studies have shown that for tapping episodic foresight 
experimentally, it is crucial to differentiate contexts that appeal to rather semantic or 
script-like knowledge (Hudson, Sosa, & Shapiro, 1997) from those contexts truly requiring 
flexible (episodic) forecasting of specific future events; for example Atance and Meltzoff 
(2005) found that when choosing an item that would be useful in a specific future 
scenario, specifically younger children had a tendency to base their choices on semantic 
associations between item and scenario rather than the item’s future use (e.g. choosing 
to take ice cubes to a snow-scenario instead of the winter coat).  Furthermore, even 
knowledge-based routine decisions (e.g. the default to prefer pretzels over water) are 
discarded by children’s current physical states, to the end that a current desire (e.g. 
thirst) impedes children’s future-oriented decision-making even at the age of 7 (Atance & 
Meltzoff, 2006; Mahy, Grass, Wagner, & Kliegel, in press).  These examples demonstrate 
that future oriented behavior in children, besides the underlying conception of time 
generally recurs to, and depends on the availability of other cognitive resources, like 
semantic knowledge and executive functions. 
1.2.3 Mental Time Travel 
A growing body of work has focused on the combined capacity of episodic 
thought into both temporal directions.  The ability to mentally re-experience the past and 
to pre-experience the future is often called “mental time travel” (MTT) (Atance, 2008; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007).  Theoretically, the basic idea behind research on 
mental time travel is that there is a unitary capacity to cognitively travel in time that 
underlies our thinking about both past and future events (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Bischof-
Köhler, 2000; Tulving, 1999, 2005).  Empirically, MTT research suggests that the two 
capacities (reasoning about the past and reasoning about the future) emerge in 
synchrony and in a correlated fashion between three and five years of age (see, for a 





between past and future cognition have been documented, for example, in language 
comprehension (“yesterday” / “tomorrow”) (Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Harner, 1975), 
and tasks involving both the concept of a past self (delayed self-recognition), and the 
concept of a future self (delay of gratification) (Lemmon & Moore, 2001).  In addition, 
neuropsychological research on adults suggests shared underlying neural substrates of 
episodic memory and episodic foresight (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & 
Kihlstrom, 2002).  Converging evidence for fundamental cognitive changes around the 
ages of three to five comes from related lines of research on the development of 
temporal language (Friedman, 2004; Harner, 1980; Hudson, Shapiro, & Sosa, 1995), 
episodic memory (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; Nelson, 1993; Perner & Ruffman, 1995) and 
future planning (Atance & Jackson, 2009; Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Russell et al., 2010; 
Thompson et al., 1997).  Less emphasis, however, has been put on the question which 
conceptual capacities exactly underlie children’s temporal cognition: Which aspects of 
time do children represent, and in which ways? 
In section 1.1 different characteristics of the conception of time were described, 
among these the representation of temporal succession which helps to anchor and order 
single events in the temporal framework.  What comes along with this characteristic, is 
the perceived direction of time, or the so called “arrow of time” (e.g. Kutach, 2011; Le 
Poidevin, 2007).  Evidence for temporal skills in children as presented in the above 
section, does not provide insight into the underlying temporal representations that 
children might have.  Do children, who start to reflect on past experiences and plan for 
their future, grasp the generic difference between past and future events? Do they 
represent temporal direction?  The temporal order of events is determined by their 
cause-effect relationships - may these be physical or social-normative in nature -, and 
these relationships imply the asymmetry that future events can possibly be influenced by 
events that are brought about in the present, but this does not apply for the past (Kutach, 
2011).  Similarly, present actions are often normatively bound to anterior actions and are 
understood in the context of past events, but they actively create the framework for 
future actions and therefore impact on our beliefs of what is likely to happen in the 
future (Bratman, 1984, 2000).  Is children’s understanding of causality and normativity 





flexible in such a way that it evaluates the relations between past, present and future 
events appropriately?  Additionally, the significance of meta-representation in the sense 
of representing the self as a continuously existing entity that changes over time, has been 
carved out in the above section.  Do children represent events in time in the described 
way and understand their relations to the present self?  The following sections review 
and critically examine existing research on the aspects of temporal cognition that are 
considered to be necessary for the development of mature temporal thought in children.  
1.3.1 The aspect of causality in temporal understanding 
In specification of the above thoughts and arguments we can summarize the 
following essential properties of temporal matters: minimally, time is conceived of as a 
sequence of events, such that (i) each event in time bears some temporal relations to the 
present (having happened before the present or going to happen after it).  Relatedly, any 
two events in time (ii) stand in a definite temporal relation to each other, and (iii) are 
linked by causal relations such that – asymmetrically - earlier events may causally impact 
on later events, but not vice versa (Hoerl & McCormack, 2011; Kutach, 2011; Le Poidevin, 
2003).  Mature thinking about time thus involves the appreciation of temporal-causal 
relations between events and the capacity to apply this explicit conceptual 
representation flexibly to past and future contexts.  When we know that effect E is usually 
brought about by cause C, and witness E taking place, we infer that C must have 
happened before.  And when we plan for the future, we know that when we would like E 
to happen at a certain point in time tE, we would have to bring about C at some point in 
time before tE. 
This kind of explicit reasoning on the basis of temporal and causal information is 
sometimes called “temporal-causal reasoning” (TCR) (Hoerl & McCormack, 2011; 
McCormack & Hoerl, 2005).  Crucially, this form of reasoning needs to be distinguished 
from simpler cognitive processes with which it might easily be confused, most 
importantly from processes that are sensitive to temporal-causal relations without 
explicitly representing them.  One example of such simpler processes is children’s 
capacity to keep track of the causal flow of events over time (without representing it 





Somerville, 1985; Piaget, 1954; Somerville & Capuani-Shumaker, 1984).  In typical 
invisible displacement tasks, subjects see an object O being occluded, say in the 
experimenter’s fist, at t1.  Then the fist moves into box 1 at t2, reappears at t3 and moves 
into box 2 at t4 before the empty hand re-appears from box 2 at t5.  Crucially, at t3, the 
experimenter opens her fist and - in different conditions - either shows that O is still there 
or that it is not there anymore before closing the fist again.  The child’s task is now to 
determine where O is.  Arguably, this task can be solved in much simpler ways: subjects 
do not have to explicitly reason about temporal and causal relations.  Rather, over time 
the child can simply update her representation of the whereabouts of O based on the 
current perceptual information (in the one case: seeing directly that O got lost in box 1 
when the hand at t3 is empty; in the other case: seeing the object at t3 in the hand, then 
keeping track of the hand with the object and seeing directly at t5 that the object got lost 
in box 2 (see McColgan & McCormack, 2008).   
In contrast to explicit temporal-causal reasoning, such updating, however, is 
limited in fundamental ways: While TCR works flexibly into the past and future on the 
basis of information about the order of events and potential causal relations (in the past, 
present or future), updating can only be made use of in the present in a given situation 
on the basis of perceptually available information.   
This is analogous to the scopes and limits of different forms of spatial cognition: 
Implicit egocentric representations of spatial matters (relative to one’s own body) allow a 
subject to solve certain tasks.  For example, a subject may keep track of and constantly 
update the egocentric relations of her current position P to her own home base H while 
foraging and can use this information to get home (much like the “homing vectors” used 
in insect navigation, (e.g. Fujita, Loomis, Klatzky, & Golledge, 1990)).  However, this 
egocentric information is of only limited use: Imagine the subject is transferred to some 
other place Q in the environment.  An egocentric representation specifying the relation of 
P to H is of no use then (it would move the subject at Q in the direction in which H would 
be seen from P – that is, quite the wrong direction).  Explicit allocentric representations, 
in contrast, in the form of mental maps or the like, allow a more flexible and systematic 
form of thought about spatial relations from various positions (Burgess, 2006).  Implicit 





points (in space or time), while explicit forms of temporal and spatial representations 
allow flexible reasoning from any point (in space or time). 
Evidence for the development of such flexible temporal-causal reasoning comes 
from recent studies by Povinelli et al. (1999) and McCormack and colleagues (McColgan & 
McCormack, 2008; McCormack & Hoerl, 2005, 2007).  The basic logic of the tasks used in 
these studies is that subjects had to mentally re-construct (or pre-construct) a sequence 
of causally linked events in order to correctly infer a present (or an anticipated future) 
state of the world (e.g. an object’s location).  Importantly, these tasks were designed in 
such a way that they required proper temporal-causal reasoning as children could not 
perceptually update their representations of the location of the object in question.  
Instead, children had to combine information about the temporal relations of some 
events with their knowledge of possible causal relations between the events.  In one task 
designed to assess past-directed TCR, children learned that an action A produced effect 
EA and another action B caused effect EB, and that the effect of one action was 
overridden and replaced by the effects of temporally successive actions.  On the basis of 
information about the order of two successive events, only 5-year-olds were able to 
flexibly combine this information and infer the ultimate effect correctly (if A was before B, 
EB would hold in the end, but if B was before A, EA would hold in the end) (McCormack & 
Hoerl, 2005, 2007; see also Povinelli et al., 1999).  
In a different study McColgan and McCormack (2008) compared children’s TCR 
skills in both temporal directions using separate yet structurally analogous tasks for 
reasoning about the past and reasoning about the future.  In a search task children 
observed a puppet walking through a miniature-zoo, passing different cages and taking a 
Polaroid picture at the kangaroo’s cage.  At the end of the visit the puppet noticed the 
camera to be missing.  In view of the photo of the kangaroo children were asked to 
indicate where in the zoo the camera might have been lost.  If children correctly 
combined knowledge about the temporal order of events (determined by the direction of 
the path) with causal evidence provided by the photo, then they would only choose 
locations that were visited after the kangaroo’s cage.  4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-





Reasoning about the future was assessed in a similar planning task: children were 
told that a puppet wanted to visit the zoo and take a picture of the kangaroo.  The 
children’s task was to preposition the camera in the zoo and enable the puppet to take 
the desired picture when passing by the kangaroo’s cage.  Again, children had to combine 
spatiotemporal knowledge about the direction of the path with causal knowledge about 
the course of events (‘picking up the camera’ is a causal prerequisite for ‘taking a 
picture’).  In a series of five experiments, 5-year-olds solved this task correctly by 
prepositioning the camera at a location before the kangaroo’s cage, whereas 3- and 4-
year-olds did not perform above chance level. 
In sum, these studies thus suggest that temporal-causal reasoning emerges 
around the age of four to five years, and that there might be an asymmetry such that 
past-directed TCR precedes future-directed TCR.  However, these studies leave open a 
number of important questions.  First, children’s competence might have been 
underestimated due to specific task demands (for example, having to do with the 
background knowledge about the workings of cameras the task requires– which, as we 
know, is not trivial for young children (Zaitchik, 1990)).  Second, there is the contrary 
possibility that existing tasks might have overestimated children’s competence, producing 
false positives.  This might have been the case because there was a fundamental 
confound between type of task and the correct answer: in the search task the correct 
answer was always the location(s) after the kangaroo whereas in the planning version it 
was always the location(s) before the kangaroo.  Children’s responses might therefore 
result from a bias to the particular side in the respective task.  Results would be more 
convincing if children would also succeed in tasks where a future location after the 
kangaroo’s cage had to be inferred, and a location before, in the search task respectively.  
Third, in light of this confound between condition and correct answer, the asymmetry 
found between past- and future-directed TCR (the former preceding the latter) is difficult 
to interpret.  The pattern of responses in the 4-year-olds (mastering only past-directed 
tasks) might have come from a default tendency to choose locations after the kangaroo’s 
cage (resulting in correct answers in the past but incorrect answers in the future 
condition).  Finally, the underlying assumptions of these studies are (i) that the tasks 





very similar tasks that do not necessarily require TCR should be solved earlier in 
development.  Since, however, these assumptions have not been empirically tested in 
those studies, whether they are in fact true is a very interesting open empirical question 
(but see McCormack and Hoerl (2005) for such a minimal contrast pair of another 
temporal task that had two versions: a version that can be solved by mere updating in 
contrast to another version that requires TCR).  Study Set 1 approaches this interesting 
question building upon and extending earlier research on children’s TCR. 
1.3.2 The aspect of normativity in temporal understanding 
One defining characteristic of temporal cognition is the conception of the 
temporally extended self (see section 1.1).  Part of this conception is the understanding of 
the self not only as persisting in time, but also as acting in time.  Temporally extended 
agency is what enables humans to make plans and coordinate activities (Bratman, 2000).  
Mental states, like desires and beliefs, create the motivation - the internal basis - for 
actions, while communicating these internal plans creates social obligations.  An agent A, 
who commits himself to do X, can create under certain circumstances (as will be specified 
below) another agent’s belief e.g. of the kind: [A will do X].  Noticeably, in this example 
the commitment of A binds A over time: the utterance of the intended action as intended 
action has normative outreach into the future (Mant & Perner, 1988).  How is children’s 
understanding of this normative outreach?  Do they track obligations over time that 
originate from communicative acts?  Do they differentiate the kinds of obligations 
entailed in specific utterances?  The following section provides a closer look at what kinds 
of speech acts entail what kinds of normative commitments. 
Our speech acts can refer to events in time that are different from the present, 
and they have normative outreach into the past and the future.  When reaching out into 
the future, e.g., a speech act can do this - even with the same propositional content - in 
two fundamentally different normative ways: (i) representing the future as it 
(subjectively) will be, or (ii) representing the future as it (subjectively) ought to be from 
one’s point of view.  Paradigmatic mental states of type (i) are beliefs about the future, 
and the paradigmatic corresponding speech acts are assertions about the future 





direction of fit (Searle, 1969, 1983), aiming at representing the world truly and accurately.  
If the propositional content of “Peter will eat the cake” is not fulfilled, the mistake is on 
the part of the speaker.  Paradigmatic mental states of type (ii) are desires about future 
events, typically expressed in imperative speech acts like “Peter, eat the cake!”  These 
have the so-called world-to-mind direction of fit, aiming at bringing the world in line with 
the content of the mental state/speech act.  When the propositional content of “Peter, 
eat the cake!”, - which is in fact the very same propositional content as in the case of the 
prediction “Peter will eat the cake” - namely the proposition <that Peter will eat the 
cake> is not fulfilled, the mistake is now not on the part of the speaker, but on the part of 
the addressee.   
Different kinds of speech acts such as assertions and imperative speech acts can 
take the very same content (e.g. the proposition <that Peter will eat the cake>) but differ 
in their mode – much like different kinds of propositional attitudes such as believing and 
desiring can have the same content (e.g. <that Peter will eat the cake>) while differing in 
psychological mode.  Now, what determines the mode of a propositional attitude or a 
speech act?  In the case of propositional attitudes, the mode is essentially constituted by 
the functional role of a given type of attitude – by what job this attitude does in the 
mental economy of the subject (e.g. beliefs are attitudes that aim at tracking reality and 
are therefore sensitive to perceptual evidence, that lead inferentially to other beliefs, and 
that together with desires rationalize and lead to actions (Fodor, 1985; Putnam, 1960; 
Sellars, 1956).  The mode of a speech act, in contrast, is largely, but not exclusively 
determined by the psychological attitude of the speaker.  For example, although 
imperative speech acts are largely constituted by the expression of a desire to someone 
else, not any utterance that expresses a desire towards someone constitutes an 
imperative speech act.  For each given type of speech act, there are specific background 
conditions, varying from one type of speech act to another, that have to be met in order 
for such a speech act to successfully materialize (Searle, 1969).  More specifically, 
imperative speech acts have some such success conditions that do not apply to other 
speech acts, assertions in particular.  These conditions include the following:  the 
imperative is reasonable, the speaker is in a position to reasonably ask the addressee to 





this fails to constitute a successful imperative speech act…), and the addressee 
acknowledges the imperative (e.g. “Okay!”).  Only if these conditions are met, has the 
speaker performed a successful imperative and has an obligation been transferred on the 
addressee.   
If such conditions are met, due to their different logical structures and normative 
forces, future-directed assertive and imperative speech acts engender very different 
normative relations to the future in speakers and addressees: speakers of assertions are 
committed to the truth of predicted future states of affairs whereas addressees of 
imperatives are committed to bringing about the desired states of affairs.  
From the point of view of cognitive development, the fundamental question is 
how children’s grasp of these different kinds of cognitively reaching out into the future 
emerges and develops.  Existing studies on pragmatic development suggest that 
children’s understanding of the logical structure of future-directed speech acts develops 
rather late, between the ages of seven and nine (Astington, 1988, 1990; Maas & 
Abbeduto, 1998).  This research shows that children around five to six years of age find it 
difficult to distinguish the different kinds of commitments engendered by predictions and 
promises (note that promises are basically imperatives to oneself (Searle, 1969)): When 
asked whether someone promised or predicted something, children judged any speech 
acts  ̶ predictions and promises alike  ̶  as predictions when they were unfulfilled, and as 
promises when their content came true.  Only beginning with age nine did children 
discriminate predictions and promises by holding speakers responsible for the fulfillment 
when the speech act was a promise, but not if the speech act was a prediction.  
What these results might suggest is that it is not before well into school age that 
children come to differentiate the underlying normative force and directions-of-fit of 
different types of future-oriented speech acts.  However, such a strong conclusion clearly 
might not be warranted by the data.  First, the tasks used so far are quite demanding, as 
children had to follow, memorize and to judge hypothetical stories instead of perceiving 
the critical events directly.  Second, participants had to judge the stories they were 
presented with by verbally responding to a series of experimenter-questions, which again 





thus possible that the methodology of previous studies might have seriously 
underestimated young children’s competence and produced false negatives. 
In fact, recent research investigating children’s understanding of speech acts with 
alternative methods might be compatible with this hypothesis; For present-tense speech 
acts, it has been shown that children as young as two to three years of age are able to 
differentiate the direction of fit of speech acts with the same propositional content.  They 
selectively criticized a speaker for a false assertion of the type “Actor does X” (to the 
effect that the actor was doing Y at the time of the utterance), but the actor for not 
complying with a speaker’s imperative (“Actor, do X!” with the actor performing a 
different action at the time of the utterance) (Rakoczy & Tomasello, 2009).   
Yet, there is no research that tackles the question when children start to 
temporally track commitments that are implicate in speech acts referring to times 
different from the present.  Sensitivity for such normative outreach of language would be 
evidenced, e.g. by the differentiation of directions of fit, as shown for the present tense 
by Rakoczy and Tomasello (2009).  Therefore Study Set 2 aims to contribute to our 
understanding of children’s grasp of the underlying normative structure of future-directed 
speech acts, by the application of less demanding, action-based measures that require 
less memory and verbal skills than the methodologies used in the experiments discussed 
above.  
1.3.3 The aspect of perspective in temporal understanding 
The third aspect that plays an essential role in the development of temporal 
cognition is temporal perspective.  Our thinking comprises temporal perspective in the 
same way that it comprises spatial perspective: we think of an event as happening before, 
simultaneously with, or after other events, just as we represent an object as being 
located next to, behind, on top of, etc. other objects in space.  This idea was alluded to 
already in terms of meta-representation, or the representation of a temporally extended 
self (see section 1.1).  As for spatial perspective, the representation of the self as a 
“permanent” entity that is located in (space and) time is necessary for understanding 
temporal perspective.  A mind endowed with this representation is able to represent one 





to an infinite number of certain points in time while constantly changing perspective: 
referring to something as “now” is having referred to it yesterday as “tomorrow” (Bieri, 
1986).  In this view, temporal perspective changes as soon as a new representation - be it 
an impression, the perception of an event, or another form of representation - is added 
to the individual’s storage of representations.  It is due to this meta-representation (of 
representations formed at specific points in time) that a single representation that is 
perceived as “present” (although it already belongs to the past at the time it is 
represented, see Le Poidevin (2007)) doesn’t simply vanish.  Instead it is stored 
(represented) in relative position to the new current event (i.e. relative to the perceived 
present) within our temporal framework. 
But there is a second interpretation of temporal perspective, which, instead of 
focusing on the permanent change of perspective in the flow of time, applies to our 
ability to represent event-relations from different temporal mental viewpoints.  Similar to 
the different possible angles from which the relation of two objects is represented 
differently (see Figure 1) the temporal relation between two events in time can be 
represented according to different points of reference.  As an example, imagine the boy 
Abe to visit the exhibition of a rock.  At this time (t1) he will form the representation ‘I am 
seeing the rock’.  Leaving the exhibition hall he stumbles across a bar which is lying on the 
ground (t2: ‘I am stumbling across a bar’).  When he later (t3) tells his friend Bea (a) “I had 
just seen the rock, when I stumbled across a bar.”, Abe is coordinating the actual time of 
the event (stumbling across the bar, t2) with an earlier reference time (seeing the rock, t1), 
see Figure 2.  The other way around, he could have used t1 as the event time and making 
reference to t2 by saying (b) “When I saw the rock, I didn’t expect that I would stumble 
later.”  In the two sentences the same event sequence is described from different 
temporal perspectives: in (a) the point of view rests on t2, whereas in (b) the point of view 
is his representational state at t1.  That is, apart from the present time, i.e. the speech 
time, when he talks to Bea, Abe coordinates two additional points in time, event time and 
reference time (Weist, 1989).  In analogy to the concept of “spatial decentering” (Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1956), this kind of temporal perspective taking has been termed “temporal 
decentering” by some authors (Campbell, 2001; Cromer, 1971; McCormack & Hoerl, 





events, the speaker is required to mentally “decenter” from his present view, in order to 
represent the sequence in an “event-independent” fashion, i.e. from any possible 
temporal perspective that is different from the speaker’s present (see McCormack & 
Hoerl, 1999; McCormack & Hoerl, 2008).   
 
Figure 1.  Representing the spatial relation of two objects differently from different perspectives: Abe 
represents the objects’ relation as [the bar is in front of the rock], Bea’s representation is [the bar is 
behind the rock]). Reprint from Perner et al. (2003).  
 
Figure 2.  Representing the temporal relation of two events from different perspectives: the viewpoint 
taken (i.e. the event time) in utterance (a) is t2, in utterance (b) event time is t1. 
 
To our knowledge, there is only one study that has directly aimed to investigate 
temporal decentering in children so far: Richard Cromer (1971) presented four- to seven-
year-old children with short stories consisting of a series of pictures, one picture after 
another in left to right direction, while the story was told.  On each picture a speech 
bubble indicated the protagonist saying something.  After being told the story, children 






certain utterance (or, in another condition, which other picture of the same story the 
protagonist is talking about in a certain picture).  For example, in one story a girl visited a 
farm in the country and experienced different things (seeing a cow, picking some flowers 
etc.).  In the subsequent test children were asked to indicate, e.g., “in which picture can 
the little girl say: I’ll pick flowers.” or “I have seen a cow” alternatively.  According to 
Cromer, answering these questions required temporal decentering when the correct 
picture to point to was different from the one depicting the event itself (e.g., a correct 
response to the first example, “I’ll pick flowers”, would have been identifying a picture 
left from, i.e. before, the one where the girl picked flowers.)  Results suggested that 
children of four and five years were able to give decentered responses.   
Early research on children’s ability to represent the spatio-visual perspective of 
another person (which differs from their own perspective), suggested that spatial 
decentering emerges somewhat later in development than Cromer’s results suggested 
for temporal decentering (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956).  Though, from later investigations 
and building upon Piaget’s work it was conveyed that children around age three 
understand that a person that is located in a different angle to an object than they 
themselves, has a different perception of the object, accordingly (level I perspective 
taking).  With age four children already begin to represent and take into account the 
specific kind of the other’s representation in addition to their own (level II perspective 
taking) (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Masangkay et al., 1974; Moll, Meltzoff, 
Merzsch, & Tomasello, 2013).  The different levels of visual perspective taking are 
reflected in the wording used to describe the different underlying cognitive abilities, e.g. 
“taking” versus “confronting” perspectives (Moll et al., 2013), or “switching” versus 
“taking” perspectives (Perner et al., 2003).  McCormack and Hoerl (1999) argue that the 
different levels of representing perspectives apply to more domains than only spatial or 
temporal representations.  As an example for perspective “switching” as an early form of 
decentering they propose young children’s understanding of fictional narratives as not 
being real:  
We think that this early kind of decentering can be understood as being 
analogous to the abilities involved in early pretense.  Numerous authors have 
argued that in early pretense children can switch perspectives without a proper 





example, they can switch from the representation ‘‘This is a banana’’ to a 
representation ‘‘This is a telephone,’’ and, hence, pretend that the banana is a 
telephone without representing the nature of relation between these 
representations (i.e., without representing ‘‘I am pretending of the banana ‘This 
is a telephone’ ’’).  (p. 171 f.) 
Furthermore, McCormack and Hoerl claim that full-blown temporal decentering 
requires the more sophisticated form of both abilities that comprises understanding the 
nature of relation between different perspectives.  Perner and colleagues argue that a 
simultaneous integration of different representations which are incompatible from one 
single point of view (as shown e.g. in Figure 1, [the bar is in front of the rock] vs. [the bar is 
behind the rock]) is only possible by introducing different points of view through the 
concept of meta-representation (to use the bar-rock example, meta-representation 
allows for the integration of both perspectives in the sense of representing that “Abe 
represents the bar in front of the rock and Bea represents the bar behind the rock).  
According to Perner et al. (2003) a characteristic of perspective problems per se is that 
they “can be solved only by relying on a meta-representational integration” (p. 362).  In 
support of this domain-general account of perspective taking, there is evidence from 
developmental research for the joint emergence of perspective taking skills in different 
domains in children.  Correlations have been found for, e.g. children’s mental and spatio-
visual perspective taking (Bigelow & Dugas, 2009; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009).  
To conclude, understanding temporal perspective involves two major 
components: firstly, it requires the understanding that events can be represented from 
different temporal viewpoints (i.e. from points that are different from the subjective 
present).  According to Weist (1989), temporal decentering requires the mind to 
coordinate at least three points in time (i.e. speech time, event time and reference time, 
and the relations between each other).  Secondly, according to Perner’s definition, 
perspective understanding means to integrate and simultaneously represent perspectives 
that are incompatible without reference to different viewpoints on a meta-
representational level.  Cromer introduced one possibility to test children’s skill in 
temporal decentering.  However, successful performance in this task heavily relied on 
children’s verbal skills, specifically their understanding of tense (for a discussion see 





seems necessary to include the second component of taking - in the sense of mentally 
confronting - different perspectives, when testing for children’s temporal perspective 
understanding.  In the current literature there is no example of a task that combines both 
components in order to investigate temporal perspective understanding in children.  
Furthermore, it is an open question whether the development of children’s 
understanding of temporal perspective is related to the development of understanding 
perspective in other domains.  Study 3 aims to further investigate these open questions. 
The aim of this thesis is to broaden to our knowledge about the underlying 
conceptions of human temporal thought and their development in early childhood.  
Research on children’s skill in future planning and their memory for the past suggests 
substantial changes in this domain between the ages of three to six years (see section 
1.2).  In order to gain a more detailed picture of what kinds of representations might 
underlie these emerging skills in section 1.3 three aspects of mature temporal thought 
were introduced. 
First, causal connections determine the order of events in time and are therefore 
crucial for locating specific events in relation to the present or to other events.  Existing 
research suggests that children around age four are able to infer a current state on the 
basis of temporal-causal information on past events.  And it is possibly somewhat later in 
development that they begin to consider cause-effect relations when preparing for 
specific future events in the present.  Still, children’s flexibility in temporal-causal 
reasoning (TCR) and their performance in similar but simpler tasks have not been tested 
so far.  In Study Set 1 existing methodologies were adapted and further developed in 
order to close the gap in our knowledge about children’s temporal-causal reasoning. 
Second, the appreciation of normativity in children’s understanding of 
communicative acts was presented as an essential aspect for the appropriate evaluation 
of actions (and speech acts) in time.  While studies on children’s explicit conceptions of 
certain types of future-directed speech acts suggest that before age seven to nine, 
children do not properly understand concepts such as promises, there are indications of 
an earlier ability to discriminate basic normative differences in present-tense speech acts.  





Study Set 2 was designed in order to combine these two lines of research and to test for 
children’s grasp of the underlying normative implications of different types of speech acts  
that refer to future points in time (predictions, imperatives).  
Third, the understanding of perspective provides the framework for subjective 
experience within the objective world.  In the temporal domain perspective 
understanding enables us to represent an event from the viewpoint of an earlier or a 
later state of our (temporally extended) self.  Furthermore, it allows us to flexibly change 
our perspective on the order of specific events in time in relation to the present.  An 
earlier study (Cromer, 1971) tested for children’s ability to decenter in time by asking 
children to connect events in a picture–book story with complexly tensed utterances.  In 
Study 3 we used a different methodology to elicit children’s inferences on subjective 
representations of the temporal order of two events.  
  




2 STUDY SET 1: TEMPORAL-CAUSAL REASONING 
The rationale of Study Set 1 was to systematically explore the early development 
of temporal-causal reasoning by following up on previous work and systematically testing 
for children’s flexibility in temporal-causal reasoning.  To this end, the (a-)symmetry of 
temporal-causal reasoning about past and future events was investigated by 
systematically comparing the performance of children in structurally analogous search 
and planning tasks in which potential confounds between the conditions were removed.  
In order to directly distinguish TCR from simpler cognitive processes, in particular mere 
updating, a minimal contrast was devised between two versions of the past-directed 
search task that could or could not be solved by updating.  Potential task demands (such 
as complexities involved in understanding cameras) were controlled for.   
Four- and six-year-old children were tested as previous studies have shown this to 
be the age where TCR emerges and undergoes fundamental development.  Study 1a 
investigated past- and future directed temporal-causal reasoning in a future planning task 
and two structurally analogous search tasks (one of which required the structurally 
analogous TCR as the future planning task and the other one of which could be solved 
much simpler by updating).  Study 1b followed up on the findings of Study 1a by testing 
for potential factors that could explain why some of the search tasks in Study 1a were 
easier than others. 
2.1.1 Method 
Participants.  Sixty 4-year-olds (48 – 60 months, mean age = 54 months, 30 boys) 
and sixty 6-year-olds (72-83 months, mean age = 77 months, 30 boys) were tested.  Five 
additional children were excluded from the final sample due to technical error (one boy, 
four years old), uncooperative behavior (two boys, four and six years old), or because of a 
delay in language development, that hindered the child’s understanding of the stimuli 
(one boy, one girl, both four years).  Children were native German speakers, came from a 
mixed socioeconomic background and were tested either in a quiet room in their daycare 
centers or in the child lab facilities of the authors’ home institution. 
2.1 Study 1a 




2.1.2 Design & Procedure 
In a between-subjects-design children were tested in three conditions: the 
prospective reasoning group received a planning task, whereas the retrospective 
reasoning group and the updating group engaged in a search task.  Each child received 
four trials (2 in which “location 1” was the correct answer, the remaining 2 in which 
“location 2” was the correct answer; see below).  For each trial, the child watched a video 
clip together with the experimenter (E) on a notebook computer.  Dependent on test 
group E paused the video once or twice in order to make the child verbally recapitulate 
what happened so far, or to give certain hints (see below for details).  At the end of each 
video, children saw a still image of the final scene and were asked to point towards a 
location in the scene’s setup where an object must have been lost throughout the story 
(search tasks), or where an intervention should be performed in the future (planning 
task).  For answering these questions children were prompted to choose between two 
possible locations, represented by two identical looking landmarks in the scenario which 
were positioned on the left side (= obstacle 1) and on the right side of the screen (= 
obstacle 2, see Figure 3).  The side of the target location was alternated from trial to trial, 
resulting in two target (location) = 1 trials and two target (location) = 2 trials per child 
(with order counterbalanced across children) 
All materials that appeared in the videos were small toy objects manipulated by 
the hands of an anonymous puppet player.  Children listened to the narration of the story 
(voice off camera) whilst their attention towards the relevant elements on the screen was 
additionally supported by the puppet player’s gestures. 
Tasks  Irrespective of condition, children were presented with the same four 
scenarios of a character transporting goods in a container around a loop road (e.g. a girl 
walking on a loop road carrying a backpack, a train with wagons travelling on a circular 
track, etc., see Appendix S1).  The direction of the round trip was always clockwise as 
indicated in Figure 3.  In all scenarios character and container passed two obstacles 
behind (or under) which they disappeared from the observer’s view for an instant (e.g. 
the girl passing through hedges that overgrew the way, the train passing two tunnels).  In 
between the obstacles there was a stopover where goods should be delivered to 




(planning) or picked up (search).  The angle of the camera was fixed so that the entire 
setup was visible to the child throughout the video clip. 
 
Figure 3.  Schematic model of the setup children saw on the screen: A= starting point in all video clips, 
and ending point in search task (where loss of tool is recognized).  B= destination for the delivery of 
objects, or stopover for picking up objects (planning task with target location 2, only).  Obstacles 1, 2 = 
potential locations of a lost item (search task), or candidates for a future intervention (planning task). 
Obstacles 1, 2 are identical with target locations 1, 2.  
 
Planning  In a demonstration video at the beginning of each trial children 
observed the character going on a circuit on the loop road, and loosing goods 
subsequently at both obstacles.  A short verbal recapitulation together with E ensured 
that all children understood that goods fell out of the container when it passed the 
obstacles.  Then, children learned about the character’s future goal, which varied 
depending on the task’s target location: for example, a girl intended to bring a picture to 
her friend’s house which was located in between two hedges (transport object from A to 
B, target location = obstacle 1, see Figure 3).  In trials where obstacle 2 was the target 
location, the goal in this case was to return an object from B (e.g. from the friend’s house) 
to the starting point A.  Together with the child E repeated the stated goal, she reinforced 
the path`s direction and the problem of losing goods at the obstacles.  Children were then 
presented with a possible solution to that problem (e.g. a bridge was brought up, which 
could be built over a hedge).  After careful explanation of the possible solution E clearly 
pointed out to the child that this intervention could only be performed once and at one 
single obstacle. 
At the end of each trial E repeated the character’s goal again, saying e.g.: “The girl 
wants to bring the picture from here to there (pointing towards A and B on the screen).  
But this time the picture shall not get lost! What do you think, over which hedge do we 




need to build the bridge?”.  Test questions in the planning task always followed the above 
structure, irrespective of scenario or target location (see Table 1 for an overview of the 
task’s structure).  If a child did not give an answer spontaneously, E repeated these final 
sentences up to two times. 
 Planning task (Study 1a) 
 Prospective reasoning condition 
 






Target location 1 
Container is loaded with 
object 
Target location 2 
Container is empty, object 
waits at B 
Transport object from… 
A to B B to A 
…without losing it. 
Intervention at obstacle will prevent loss of cargo there! 
Test question “At which obstacle do we need to perform the intervention?” 
Table 1.  Structure of the planning task. 
 
Searching  Two groups of children received very similar versions of a search task: 
Retrospective condition.  After a short introduction to the scenario children in the 
retrospective reasoning condition were immediately presented with the character’s goal 
which was the same for target location 1 and 2, namely bringing an object from A to B 
(see Figure 3).  But importantly, in the search tasks, the character’s goal consisted of two 
sub-goals: (1) transporting the object to B and (2) performing a specific action with it (e.g. 
a girl wants to bring a picture to her friend’s house in order to hang it up on an empty 
spot on the wall).  Children observed the character’s preparations for departure at the 
starting point, which always consisted of loading the object and an additional tool into 
the container (e.g. packing the picture into the girl’s backpack, and also a tape-roll in 
order to fix the picture on the friend’s wall).  Children then saw the character 
disappearing behind obstacle 1, stopping at B and unloading the container.  The 
character’s subsequent actions differed as a function of the availability of the tool: in 




target location 2, trials object and tool were used so that the goal was fully accomplished 
(e.g. picture hangs on the wall, fixed with tape) and the tool was put back into the 
container.  In contrast, in target location 1, when opening the container, there was only 
the object left inside.  In this case only a sub-goal (1) was accomplished (e.g. the picture 
was put on the ground, the spot on the wall was left empty as it was before).  Presence or 
absence of the tool at B was not commented on by the narrator and E showed no 
reaction to the opening of the container.  It was only after travelling back to A (by passing 
obstacle 2) that the character realized the loss of the tool when finally unloading the 
container.  The loss was emphasized in the last scene of the narration and directly linked 
to the test question, e.g.: “Look, the tape-roll is not there anymore! It must have fallen out 
of the backpack in one of the two hedges! “What do you think, in which hedge did she lose 
the tape-roll?”.  After the video had stopped with a still image of the last scene, E looked 
at the child, waiting for her to give an answer to the test question.  As in the planning 
task, final sentences of the last scene were repeated up to two times if a child did not 
answer spontaneously. 
Note, that in this task, in order to answer the test question correctly, children 
needed to remember if the tool had been present at B or not.  This information was 
retrospectively available through the causal cue at B (the still image still showed if the 
goal had been fully or only partially accomplished).   
Updating condition.  The task for the updating group was different in this respect, 
although the very same video material was used.  The difference resulted from three 
modifications which enabled children to track the relevant item, i.e. the tool, throughout 
the video: first, children tested in the this group received an additional demonstration 
video at the beginning of each trial, which was similar to the one used in the planning task 
(see description above), but in this group it served the purpose of accustoming children 
to the object-search context.  Second, before the character’s departure at A, children 
were prompted by the narrator and by E to focus their attention on the tool’s 
whereabouts (for example, narrator: “Now pay attention to what is going to happen to 
the tape-roll!”, E: “Okay, what are we supposed to pay attention to?”).  Third, when 
unloading at B, E called children’s attention in order to encourage a mental update of the 
tool’s location (“Look what’s inside!”).  See Appendix S1 for a schematic comparison of 




both versions of the search task presented to the retrospective reasoning- and to the 
updating group. 
Within all three test groups, the text and gestural hints of E and the narrator were 
kept parallel over all scenarios and for each of the conditions (target location 1, 2). 
2.1.3 Results & Discussion 
Data points from two 4-year-olds were excluded from the final analysis (one from 
the retrospective, one from the prospective condition) because they failed to give 
unambiguous answers despite repeated questioning (choosing either both obstacles or 
none). 
Children in each condition received two trials in which obstacle 1 was the correct answer 
(target = 1) and two trials in which obstacle 2 was correct (target = 2).  Sum scores of 
obstacle 1 and obstacle 2 answers for both age groups and in both versions of each 
condition are depicted in Figure 4.  For purposes of statistical analyses, in each condition 
a difference score was computed of obstacle 1 minus obstacle 2 answers (ranging from -2 
to 2).  A difference score of 2 would be the normatively correct pattern in target = 1 
versions, whereas a score of -2 would be the normatively correct pattern in target = 2 
versions.  A 2 (target location: 1, 2) X 3 (condition: retrospective, updating, planning) X 2 
(age group) mixed-factors ANOVA on this difference score yielded significant main effects 
of condition (F(2, 114) = 39.57, p < .001, ηp² = .41) and target location (F(1, 114) = 164.59, 
p < .001, ηp² = .59). There was a significant interaction of target location and age (F(1, 
114) = 13.54 , p < .001, ηp² = .11) and also an interaction of target location and condition 
(F(2, 114) = 7.6, p = .001, ηp² = .12). 
To test for children’s competence in each of the conditions, separate t-tests 
against chance were performed for both age groups (testing the difference score against 
the chance value of 0 – mathematically equivalent to testing the obstacle 1 versus 
obstacle 2 answers).   
The 4-year-olds in the updating conditions performed above chance both in target 
= 1 trials (t(19) = 2.18, p < .05, d = .49) [answering more often obstacle 1 than obstacle 2] 
and in target = 2 trials (t(19) = -8.72, p < .001, d = 2.0) [showing the reverse pattern].  In 




the retrospective reasoning group they performed above chance only in target = 2 trials 
(t(19) = -6.10, p < .001, d = 1.4).  In trials with target = 1, children of this group gave 
significantly more often incorrect obstacle 2 than correct obstacle 1 answers (t(19) = -
2.379, p < .05, d = .53 ).  In the prospective reasoning group 4-year-olds showed no 
preference for one of the obstacles in trials with target location 2 (p = .82), but 
performed above chance in trials with target location 1 (t(19) = 5.48, p < .001, d = 1.2). 
 
Figure 4.  Mean choices of obstacle 1 and obstacle 2 as a function of condition (planning, 
retrospective, updating) and target location (1; 2), for the 4-year-olds (a) and the 6-year-olds (b), Study 
1a. 




Like the 4-year-olds, the 6-year-olds succeeded in both versions of the updating 
task, actually performing very close to ceiling (target = 1, t(19) = 5.25, p < .001, d = 1.2; 
for target = 2 performance was perfect and so no inference statistics could be 
computed).  In contrast to the 4-year-olds, the older children succeeded in both 
conditions of the planning task (target = 1, t(19) = 19.0, p < .001, d = 4.3; target = 2, t(19) 
= -2.93, p < .01, d = .66).  In the retrospective conditions, 6-year-olds performed perfect 
in target = 2 trials (all children chose obstacle 2 in both trials) but performance did not 
differ from chance in the target = 1 version (p = 1.0).   
In sum, the present study tested 4- and 6-year-olds on structurally analogous 
retrospective searching and prospective planning tasks.  The retrospective task was 
compared in a minimal contrast with an updating task that was supposed to be solvable 
without temporal-causal reasoning.  The results revealed, first, that in fact, the updating 
task was the easiest and was mastered in all versions by both age groups.  Second, the 
superficially very similar retrospective search task was indeed more difficult and was not 
fully mastered in all versions by any of the two age groups.  Both 4- and 6-year-olds 
succeeded in target (location) = 2 versions, but failed in target = 1 versions (6-year-olds 
answering at chance, 4-year-olds even significantly below chance).  Third, the structurally 
analogous prospective planning task was fully mastered by 6-year-olds who answered 
correctly in all versions, and only partly mastered by 4-year-olds who answered correctly 
in target = 1, but not in target = 2 versions.   
How are these findings to be interpreted, in particular regarding the failure of 
both age groups in the target = 1 versions of the retrospective condition?  Do these 
findings suggest true competence problems, or might they be indicative of some 
performance problems due to extraneous task demands?  One possibility along the latter 
lines is that children’s competence got masked by the use of a temporal-spatial primacy 
bias: it is conceivable that when engaged in temporal-causal reasoning, children travel 
along the time-line, so to speak, either backward or forward in time.  When doing so, they 
then often settle on the first possible answer they encounter.  And this would lead to the 
following pattern: in prospective reasoning, children travel forward in time (and therefore 
space), first encounter location 1 and settle on this answer.  In the retrospective 




reasoning task, in contrast, they travel backwards in time (and therefore space), first 
encountering location 2 and settling on this answer.  
Alternatively, another way in which Study 1a might have posed performance 
problems that masked children’s competence is that the asymmetry in terms of evidential 
relations between the different versions played a crucial role.  In target = 2 versions of 
the retrospective conditions, there is positive evidence (still visible at the time of the test 
question, for example, in form of the tape which fixes the picture on the wall) that the 
object was still present at B, from which the subject can infer that it must have been lost 
at location 2 (along the following lines: “The picture is on the wall, fixed with tape.  The 
tape was thus still present at B, and therefore it must have been lost at location 2”).  In 
target = 1 versions, in contrast, there is no such positive evidence, but only absence of 
evidence that the object was still present at B (embodied in the fact that the picture lies 
on the ground rather than hanging on the wall).  Consequently, the line of reasoning 
required in order to infer the object’s location seems much more complicated: “If the 
tape had been present at B, then the picture would have been fixed on the wall.  As the 
picture lies on the ground, the tape must have been lost before B, so it must be in 
location 1”.  This chain of reasoning seems generally more complex, and more specifically 
requires rather sophisticated counterfactual reasoning –which is known to show 
protracted development from age four sometimes even until age 12 (Perner & 
Rafetseder, 2011; Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013).  It is thus possible that in the 
present study children failed to solve the target location 1 condition, not because of 
constraints in their ability to reason about temporal-causal relationships, but because of 
the task demands, in particular in terms of counterfactual reasoning. 
Study 1b, therefore, followed up on the possible problem of differential task 
demands in the retrospective conditions of Study 1a.  Children were tested on a new 
version of the search task with reversed evidential structure:  This time conclusive 
(visible) evidence was provided for the identification of obstacle 1 as target location, 
whereas evidence was negative in case of obstacle 2 being the target location. 
2.2 Study 1b 





Participants  A different sample of twenty 4-year-olds (49 – 59 months, mean age 
= 54 months, 11 boys) and twenty 6-year-olds (72 – 83 months, mean age = 76 months, 8 
boys), all native German speakers, was drawn from the same database as in Study 1a.  
Two additional children (one boy, one girl, four years old) were excluded from the final 
sample due to experimenter errors and problems in understanding the video stimuli.  
Participants were either tested in their day-care centers or in the child lab. 
2.2.2 Design & Procedure 
As in Study 1a, children received four trials of the new search task with the 
storyline varied over the same four scenarios.  Materials and setup of the videos were 
identical to Study 1a and also the storyline was kept parallel apart from one crucial 
change to the plot: instead of losing the tool, in this new task the character would find the 
tool either in obstacle 1 or 2.  This change became manifest in the course of events, first, 
when the character departed at A with the object only in the container (e.g. the picture).  
Second, in this new version the tool could not be presented when explaining the 
character’s goal, but instead E asked the child what kind of tool would be useful in order 
to fully accomplish the stated goal (e.g. “Look, she wants to hang the picture up there on 
the wall. What do you think, what would one need in order to hang it up there?”).  This 
was done to establish the connection between tool-use and full achievement of the goal.  
If the child did not name it spontaneously, E prompted the tool immediately (e.g. “I think 
a piece of tape would do (as well), right?”) and both agreed on this one as suitable for the 
goal’s achievement.  Third, the container was unloaded at B just as in Study 1a, but this 
time, in trials with target (location) = 1, tool and object were inside, whereas in target = 2 
trials there was only the object.  The action was performed accordingly with or without 
tool-use, resulting in a visible causal cue at B in the former, and a negative cue in the 
latter condition (e.g. target = 1: picture hangs on the wall fixed with tape, target = 2: 
picture lies on the ground).  As in Study 1a, presence or absence of the tool at B was not 
commented on by the narrator and E showed no reaction to the opening of the 
container.  It was only when returning to A and when the container was finally unloaded, 
that the presence of the tool was emphasized (puppet player pointing towards the tool, 
“Look! On her way Lisa found a tape-roll! She must have found it in one of the two 




hedges!”).  Test questions followed the very same structure of those in Study 1a, e.g. 
“What do you think, in which hedge did she find the tape-roll?”  See Appendix S1 for a 
schematic comparison of both versions of the retrospective reasoning task used in Study 
1a and 1b.   
2.2.3 Results & Discussion 
The mean sum scores of children’s obstacle 1 and obstacle 2 choices in each 
condition are depicted in Figure 5.  Data on the new retrospective reasoning task were 
processed in the same way as in Study 1a, by computing a difference score of obstacle 1 
minus obstacle 2 answers (range -2 to 2) per condition: A 2 (target location: 1, 2) X 2 (age 
group) ANOVA on this difference score yielded a significant main effect of target location 
(F(1, 38) = 63.33, p < .001, ηp² = .63) and a significant interaction effect of target location 
and age group (F(1, 38) = 15.83, p < .001, ηp² = .29).  Subsequent analyses tested 
children’s competence in each condition and for each age group separately against 
chance (t-tests on difference scores against the chance value of 0). 
Just like in Study 1a, the 6-year-olds performed at ceiling in the new target = 2 
trials t(19) = -8.72, p < .001, d = 2.0).  But in contrast to Study 1a, they now answered the 
new target =1 condition correctly (t(19) = 5.48, p < .001, d = 1.2).  The 4-year-olds, like in 
Study 1a, performed above chance in only one version of the task.  In spite of the new 
evidential structure this was again the target location 2 version, (t(19) = -2.37, p < .05, d = 
.53).  Performance in the target =1 condition did not differ from chance performance 
(t(19) = .62, p = .54). 
In order to test whether the crucial modifications introduced in Study 1b in form 
of the reversed evidential structure made a difference to children’s answer patterns, 
performance across Studies 1 and 2 was compared. To this end, a three-way ANOVA with 
the factors Study 1a/1b (between-subjects), target location (within-subjects), and age 
group (between subjects) on the difference score of obstacle 1 minus obstacle 2 answers 
(range -2 to 2) was computed.  This ANOVA revealed significant main effects of target 
location (F(1, 76) = 78.18, p < .001, ηp² = .51) and study (F(1, 76) = 17.49, p < .001, ηp² = 
.19), and a significant interaction of target location and age group (F(1, 76) = 18.97, p < 
.001, ηp² = .20).  




Separate follow-up comparisons of performance in each condition across studies 
showed that the 6-year-olds performed better in Study 1b than in Study 1a in both the 
target =1 condition (t(38) = -3.04, p < .01, d = .96), and in the target =2 condition (t(38) = -
2.18, p < .05, d = .69).  The 4-year-olds did not perform significantly better in Study 1b 
compared to Study 1a in the target = 2 condition (t(38) = -1.68. p > .05); but performance 
improved significantly from Study 1a to Study 1b in the target = 1 condition (t(38) = -2.15, 
p < .05, d = .68 – from below-chance performance in Study 1a to at-chance performance 
in Study 1b (see above). 
 
 
Figure 5.  Mean choices of obstacle 1 and obstacle 2 as a function of age and condition in the 
(retrospective reasoning) search task, Study 1b. 
 
These results suggests that 6-year-olds have a solid competence to reason flexibly 
about temporal causal relations between past and present events, but that this 
competence was masked in some versions of Study 1a by the specific task structure.  In 
particular, it seems that the asymmetry of the evidential structure of the different 
versions of the retrospective tasks played a crucial role in Study 1a: while children failed 
the target location 1 version in Study 1a, when there was only indirect evidence for what 
the correct answer was, they easily solved the adapted target location 1 version in Study 
1b – which, with a reversed evidential structure, now involved positive evidence for the 
correct answer.   




However, this interpretation leaves open two questions: first, why did the 6-year-
olds in Study 1b now solve both versions of the task (location 1 with direct positive 
evidence and location 2 with only indirect evidence) whereas the 6-year-olds in Study 1a 
only solved the version with the direct positive evidence (location 2)?  Second, why did 
the 4-year-olds improve from Study 1a to Study 1b in the target location 1 version, 
moving from below chance to chance performance, but still failed in Study 1b?  Quite 
clearly, what these findings suggest is that additional task demands were at play.  In 
particular, the target location 1 versions of the task in both studies pose some additional 
demands (beyond evidential structure) that the target location 2 versions do to not pose 
to the same degree.  What could these additional demands be?  One possibility is that 
they could have to do with temporal-spatial distance: when mentally reconstructing the 
course of events, one might take different directions in retrospection (backward) and 
prospection (forward) in mentally travelling along the track, and thus hits on different 
locations first (location 1 in prospection and location 2 in retrospection) that become 
more salient as answers – resulting in what could be called a temporal-spatial proximity 
bias (see below).  
Study Set 1 investigated the early development of temporal-causal reasoning 
(TCR) – the capacity to reason flexibly about the temporal and causal relations of past, 
present and future events in the service of retrospection and prospection.  Building on 
previous work, we pursued the following open questions: first, when does the capacity to 
engage in TCR emerge ontogenetically, and how robust and systematic is it from early 
on?  Second, are past-directed TCR and future-directed TCR based on the same capacity 
and therefore emerge and develop together? Third, is temporal-causal reasoning a 
qualitatively different capacity than simpler forms of keeping track of temporal matters?  
To address these questions, 4- and 6-year-olds were tested in analogous retrospective 
and prospective TCR task.  Following up on earlier research, retrospective and 
prospective versions were closely structurally matched, extraneous factors were 
systematically controlled for, and the retrospective task was compared to a closely 
matched, structurally similar task that differed in the crucial respect that it did not require 
TCR.   
2.3 Discussion Study Set 1 




The results suggest, first, that the capacity for TCR emerges by age four in some 
form, but undergoes important subsequent development until the age of six, where fully-
fledged competence about the past (Study 1b) and about the future (Study 1a) was 
found.  Second, the findings speak in favor of the view that past-directed TCR and future-
directed TCR are based on the same capacity by showing clear developmental symmetry 
of retrospective and prospective reasoning; 4-year-olds showed analogous competences 
and limitations in past- and future-directed versions of the task, and 6-year-olds showed 
the same robust competence – under suitable conditions - in both temporal directions.  
Third, findings from both age groups provide clear evidence that TCR is a qualitatively 
different, more complex form of temporal cognition than other forms of tracking 
temporal matters, in particular temporal updating: 4-year-olds found structurally 
matched past-directed tasks that could be solved by mere updating much easier than the 
structurally matched search tasks that did require TCR.   
These results replicate previous findings on children’s developing competence in 
temporal-causal reasoning and extend them in important ways (McColgan & McCormack, 
2008; McCormack & Hanley, 2011).  In line with earlier research, conclusive evidence for 
full-blown TCR was found towards the end of the preschool years around age five to six.  
In contrast to previous work, however, no evidence for an asymmetry between past and 
future-directed TCR was found.  And with a more stringent methodology controlling for 
potential confounding factors, the present work showed a less clear and more fragile 
pattern of competence in the 4-year-olds who managed to solve only one version of the 
search task (in which location 2 was the correct answer) and only the complementary 
version of the planning task (with location 1 as the correct answer).   
So, how is this more fragmented pattern of performance in the younger children 
in the search and the planning tasks to be interpreted?  The results of Studies 1a and 1b 
together suggest that at least two factors might underlie the limitations in the younger 
children’s performance: first, at least for the past-directed search tasks, the evidential 
structure seems to matter.  The conditions of the search tasks mastered in Study 1a were 
exactly those in which there was direct positive evidence for the correct answer to the 
test question.  This test question was where some object had been lost, and the child had 
direct positive evidence that the object must have been used in between location 1 and 




location 2 because it left a definite causal trace, and from this trace children could infer 
that the object had been present after location 1 and thus must have been lost at 
location 2.  The other condition, in which location 1 was the correct answer, required 
more complex reconstruction of the correct answer: From the fact that there was no 
causal trace of the object in between locations 1 and 2, together with the counterfactual 
premise that there would have been such a trace if the object had been present there, 
the child had to infer that the object must have been lost already at location 1.  The 
conditions in Study 1b, therefore, were exactly reversed by implementing stories in which 
objects were found rather than lost: now there was direct positive evidence that an 
object must have been found at location 1 in one condition and a more indirect 
reconstruction from the absence of such evidence that the object must have been found 
at location 2 in the other condition.  With this reversed structure, 4-year-olds now still 
performed competently in the location 2 condition, and performed significantly better 
than in Study 1a in the location 1 condition.  The evidential structure thus made a 
difference. 
However, it was far from making the whole difference since though performing 
better, younger children still did not perform above chance in the location 1 condition in 
Study 1b.  A second factor that seems to underlie the limited performance of the 4-year-
olds might thus be a general bias towards locations that are closer to one’s starting point 
when mentally travelling through time.  Children might have been subject to a spatial-
temporal proximity bias such that in the direction in which one travels along the path 
(backward in retrospective and forward in prospective tasks), the first location 
encountered becomes more salient and thus favored as an answer.  Future research will 
need to explore the role of these (and potentially other) factors more closely and 
systematically.  From a practical point of view, this is technically difficult.  Naturally, the 
evidential asymmetry applies primarily to retrospective tasks, but it is not clear at all 
whether such an asymmetry has any role to play in future-directed planning tasks.  And 
the spatial-temporal proximity bias is technically difficult to study because there seems to 
be a necessary confound such that this bias always favors one answer for retrospection 
and the reverse one for prospection. 




Apart from these more practical difficulties, however, findings from such 
limitations in performance, in particular in the younger children, are difficult to interpret 
and remain in need of theoretical clarification.  Such a pattern of limited performance as 
was found in the 4-year-olds allows two broad classes of interpretation: One possibility is 
that the findings do reveal early competence that is only masked by performance factors 
in some conditions – the ones with complex inferential structure, and the ones in which 
cognitive biases get in the way of the general competence.  This would be analogous to 
one interpretation of heuristics and biases in judgment and decision making according to 
which reasoning biases are conceptualized as showing not that adults cannot reason 
rationally, but only that their competence is often overridden by the works of such biases 
(e.g. Cohen, 1981; Stanovich & West, 2003; Stein, 1996).  With regard to previous findings 
of competence in 4-year-olds (at least in past-directed tasks) this would mean that the 
present findings would basically replicate these findings and extend them by showing 
some accidental performance limitations.  Alternatively, however, the fragile pattern of 
performance might be taken as indicative of fragile competence itself.  The fact that the 
younger children only showed performance under limited conditions, this interpretation 
goes, implies the very lack of a flexible and general capacity to reason about temporal-
causal relations.  This would be analogous to another interpretation of heuristics and 
biases according to which the extant use of such heuristics and biases shows that humans 
do not reason rationally in the first place (e.g. Stich, 1990).  With regard to previous 
findings of competence in 4-year-olds (at least in past-directed tasks) this would mean 
that the present findings fail to replicate and actually contradict them.  It is a challenging 
open question for future research to systematically explore which of these two 
interpretations is correct.  Like in the debate about the implication of reasoning biases for 
theories of human rationality, this might require the development of new experimental 
designs – in the present cases, designs that allow testing for the generality and flexibility 
of temporal-causal reasoning under conditions that lend themselves to the application of 
the biases in question to varying degrees.   
  




3 STUDY SET 2: TEMPORAL-NORMATIVE UNDERSTANDING 
The rationale of Study Set 2 was to investigate children’s understanding of the 
normative dimension of future-oriented thought and language with a similar 
methodology to that introduced by Rakoczy & Tomasello (2009).  In particular, we tested 
whether young children understand the normative commitments of different types of 
future-directed speech acts (predictions vs. imperatives) that are characterized by 
different directions of fit. In Study 2a the differentiation of directions of fit was measured 
by children’s spontaneous protest in the case of mismatches (criticizing the speaker more 
often than the actor after unfulfilled predictions, but showing the reverse pattern after 
unfulfilled imperatives). Study 2b followed up on the same paradigm introducing a 
forced-choice measure of children’s differential pointing towards either action or speech 
act in response to the question whose mistake caused the mismatch. 
3.1.1 Method 
Participants.  Sixteen 4-year-olds, (48 – 58 months, mean age = 53 months; 8 
boys) were tested (one additional child was excluded due to experimental error).  
Children were native German speakers, came from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds 
and were tested either in their daycare centers or in the child lab facilities. Parents gave 
their written consent for the participation of the children.  
3.1.2 Design & Procedure 
Warm-Up.  Children were introduced to two hand puppets (a sheep and a 
hedgehog) that were located in separate rooms of a large toy house, both facing the 
child.  The puppets were operated by a second experimenter (E2) sitting behind the toy 
house.  After a short familiarization phase the first experimenter (E1) presented two 
warm-up games which were played by the child and the puppets taking turns.  First, E1 
asked one after another to label objects depicted in a picture book.  In the second game a 
small hammer was used to push one of three differently colored balls through a hole.  In 
the course of these games both puppets repeatedly made mistakes by mislabeling objects 
and by hitting balls of the wrong color.  The aim of the warm up phase was to establish 
3.1 Study 2a 




the fact that the puppets might need the child’s help.  Therefore children were asked to 
take care that the puppets’ actions (verbal and physical) were all correct.  In case of a 
child not correcting mistakes spontaneously, E1 encouraged her to help the puppets play 
the game the right way. 
Test game.  In a within-subjects design each child participated in two kinds of test 
trials administered in two blocks of four trials each (order counterbalanced).  Both kinds 
of test trials followed the same structure and consisted of the same sliding game: one of 
the puppets (the speaker) uttered a speech act referring to the other puppet’s (the 
actor’s) future action (sliding an object (e.g. a bird) into its corresponding container (e.g. a 
nest) – with the child placing the corresponding container at the end of the slide).  As the 
actor’s object choice was invisible to the child, the child relied on the content of the 
speech act in order to choose which container would match the object that the actor 
would later send down the slide.  In all test trials the propositional content of the speech 
act was never fulfilled by the action.  This became obvious by the mismatch of object (e.g. 
fish) and container (e.g. nest) after the action.  The crucial difference between the two 
test blocks was the type of speech act: in the prediction (future-assertive) condition, the 
speaker’s prediction about the actor’s action did not come true, e.g. “I guess/I think the 
hedgehog will slide the bird.” (“Ich glaube, der Igel wird den Vogel rutschen lassen” – 
where the German “Ich glaube” translates with “I guess” or “I think”), with the actor 
sliding the fish later on, whereas in the imperative (future-directive) condition the 
speaker’s imperative was not fulfilled by the actor, e.g. “Hedgehog, slide the bird next!” 
(“Igel, lass gleich mal den Vogel rutschen!”), again with the actor sliding the fish 
afterwards (see Appendix S2-C for a detailed script of the two conditions).  
It might look like the propositional content of the assertion “I guess/ I think the 
hedgehog will slide the bird.” is actually not about the hedgehog and what it will do, but 
rather about the speaker and her belief what the hedgehog will do and therefore has 
quite a different propositional content from the imperative which clearly is about what 
the hedgehog will (ought to) do.  But the appearances are misleading here.  The standard 
use of “I guess” and “I think” is not to report a belief but to express it ((Malcolm, 1991), 
see (Diessel & Tomasello, 2001) for developmental data), more specifically to qualify the 
belief as not utterly certain (one wouldn’t say “I guess/ I think 1+1=2”).  Mostly, “I 




guess”/“I think” function as a qualifier expressing some degree of uncertainty, much like 
“probably”, and this is also the way it was used here.  There were two specific reasons for 
adding such a qualification to the expression of the speaker’s prediction: first, to make 
the speech act more natural.  The speaker made a prediction without good evidence, in 
which case a prediction without such a qualification would have sounded strange.  The 
second reason was to avoid possible mis-readings of the prediction as indirect imperative.  
The underlying problem here is that the surface form of predictions “the actor will do X” 
can be and often are used to make indirect imperatives (“all students will do their 
coursework until next week”, “you will clean up your room”).    
Procedure.  Before each test block, E1 introduced the object-container pairs to the 
child, asking her to help and find the correct match for each object (for details regarding 
the material, see Appendix S2-A).  After the child had played with the slide, the objects 
and the containers herself, the game was given to the puppets. Only the containers 
remained with the child.  At the beginning of each prediction (future-assertive) trial the 
actor puppet disappeared behind the slide in order to choose an object which he placed 
at the opening of the slide.  Then, while the actor was still absent, the speaker puppet 
told the child which object he thought the actor might play with (see Figure 6, time 1b).  
For the imperative (future-directive) trials the speaker puppet declared which object the 
actor should play, the actor agreed (see Introduction for the necessity of agreement on 
an imperative for it being valid) and then disappeared behind the slide in order to select 
the object.  After the child had prepared the slide’s end with a container, in both 
conditions the actor slid an object different from the type that was announced by the 
speaker (see Figure 6, time 2).  When the object had gone down the slide, the puppets 
remained visible to the child in their rooms (time 3).  Children could first react 
spontaneously to the situation.  Second, E1 asked them to explain what had happened. 
 
  




Figure 6.  Schematic overview of the procedure in imperative and the prediction conditions (Study 2a 
and Study 2b). 
 
The puppets’ roles of speaker and actor alternated from trial to trial. In order to 
prevent children from habituating to mismatches in the course of the session, we 
included a non-test correct trial in the middle of each block where speech act and action 
matched.  Sets of objects and containers were introduced to the child at the beginning of 
each test block.  The first set consisted of miniature animals that were to be slid into their 
corresponding housings (e.g. bird-nest, fish-aquarium).  In the second block miniatures of 
common object-container pairs were used (e.g. fried egg-pan, car-garage).  The order of 
conditions, the assignment of games to conditions, and the order of the puppet’s roles 
(speaker vs. actor) within each condition were counterbalanced across all children. 




Coding.  All sessions were videotaped, one camera capturing the child’s face and 
another capturing gestures and interactions towards the puppets.  The data were coded 
from tape by a single observer.  For all 8 test-trials coding started with the moment 
where the mismatch between speech act [object type expected] and action [object type 
played] was visible to the child, i.e. when the object had gone down the slide.  Children’s 
verbal responses towards the puppets, as well as their explanations towards E1 were 
assigned to the following hierarchical categories: 
(1) Speaker- or actor-directed protest: The child clearly criticized one of the puppets 
by calling its name and/or referencing to its mistake (e.g. “You said he slides the 
bird but you were wrong!” in response to the speaker, or “Hedgehog, look, this 
is not the bird! You did it wrong! ” in response to the actor). 
 
(2) The code ambiguous protest was assigned in two cases: Either when it was 
indeterminable for the observer which of the puppets was being criticized (e.g. 
“No! That’s wrong!” without observable direction of gaze and/ or gesturing). Or, 
when the child explicitly criticized both puppets (e.g. to E1 “Oh no, the puppets 
were wrong again!”) 
 
As the focus was on the most sophisticated forms of protest children produced, 
each trial received as score the highest score observed in the child’s response; e.g. in case 
of a child first criticizing the actor directly (1) and then simply saying to E1 “It was wrong!” 
(2), this trial was scored as actor-directed protest (1).  In the very rare case of a child 
criticizing in the same trial one puppet first and later on the other, the code for 
ambiguous protest was assigned to that trial, as the child’s criticism was directed to both 
speaker and actor. 
A second independent observer blind to the hypothesis of the study coded a 
random sample of 25% of the sessions for inter-rater reliability which was very good (к 
=.79). 
3.1.3 Results  
For each child, and for the two types of unambiguous protest (speaker-directed 
and actor-directed) and for ambiguous protest, sum scores across the four tasks per 




condition were computed in which the child showed this kind of protest.  The mean sum 
scores are depicted in Figure 7.   
 
 
Figure 7.  Responses to mismatches in Study 2a (verbal protest measure). Mean scores of trials (0-4) 
per condition (Prediction, Imperative) with each kind of protest (speaker-directed, actor-directed, 
ambiguous). 
 
As preliminary analyses found no significant effects for the order of test blocks 
(mixed factors ANOVAs, n.s.), this factor was not included in the subsequent analyses.  As 
the crucial analyses were based on specific, directed hypotheses (more protest against 
the speaker than against the actor after unfulfilled predictions, and vice versa after 
unfulfilled imperatives.  And relatedly, more protest against the speaker after unfulfilled 
predictions than after unfulfilled imperatives, and vice versa for protest against the 
actor), one-tailed tests were used.  In light of the relatively small sample size, the results 
of parametric analyses were complemented by non-parametric ones.   
First, we compared actor-directed vs. speaker-directed protest within each 
condition. In the imperative condition, children criticized the actor significantly more 
often than the speaker (t(15) = 3.22, p < .01, d = .81). This was confirmed by non-
parametric analyses, Wilcoxon test, T = 10, p < .05, r = .65.  In the prediction condition, 
however, there were no significant differences between actor-directed and speaker-




directed responses, t(15) = .49, p = .32 (Wilcoxon test, T = 32.5, p = .30), with a large 
proportion of children’s responses coded as ambiguous protest (see Figure 7).   
Testing for differences within conditions might neglect performance factors, such 
as the prepotency of one response type: in both conditions the actor’s action directly 
preceded the apparent mismatch between object and container and so the actor (and 
her action) was much more salient than the speaker and her previous speech act.  
Therefore, when deciding who caused the mismatch and who to criticize, especially in 
case of predictions, children needed to overcome a bias towards the actor, induced by 
the temporal succession of events (a bias that might have contributed to the high 
proportion of ambiguous responses in the prediction condition). 
Thus, in a second analysis we tested for differences in a given form of directed 
critique as a function of condition: Do children criticize the speaker more often in the 
prediction condition than in the imperative condition, and analogously for actor critique? 
These comparisons showed that children directed critique towards the speaker in 
prediction trials significantly more often than in imperative trials (t(15) = 2.03, p < .05, d = 
.51).  Again, non-parametric tests confirmed this result, Wilcoxon test, T = 44, p < .01, r = 
.46.   Regarding actor critique, differences between conditions were non-significant, t(15) 
= .79, p = .22, (Wilcoxon test, T = 29.5, p = .20.).  
3.1.4 Discussion 
All in all, these findings suggest that children do differentiate between the 
different kinds of speech acts to some degree, criticizing speaker or actor systematically 
as a function of condition.  These findings were very clear regarding the imperative 
condition, and regarding the critique of the speaker, but were somewhat less clear 
regarding the prediction condition, and the critique of the actor.   
One fundamental difficulty with the prediction condition compared to the 
imperative condition might lie in the ambiguity of the linguistic form vis-à-vis different 
speech act types: in the prediction condition, the linguistic form “The actor will do X” is 
more ambiguous in that this form can be used to make predictions (the paradigmatic 
case), but in exceptional circumstances also to utter commands (think of the coach saying 




to his players “All players will be on the pitch 10 minutes before the game”).  The 
imperative form “Actor, do X!”, in contrast, admits of less ambiguity.  Three points should 
be mentioned in response to this concern: First, given this is a general asymmetry on the 
level of linguistic form, there is no way around this asymmetry in tests of children’s 
understanding of the two kinds of direct future-directed speech acts (it is an interesting 
question, of course, when children come to understand indirect future-directed 
commands such as “All players will be at the pitch…”.  This, however, is a much more 
complex achievement going well beyond the more fundamental competence under study 
here). Second, since one can utter an indirect imperative only by talking to an addressee, 
the ambiguity in the prediction cases arises pragmatically only in situations where the 
speaker (e.g. the coach) talks to the actor(s) (e.g. the players).  Given in our prediction-
scenario the actor was not attending to the speech act (the actor puppet left the house 
and was invisible behind the slide) and the speaker did not explicitly address the actor, 
this ambiguity does not even seem to apply.  Third, and crucially, the structural difference 
between linguistic forms in imperative and prediction speech acts only poses a problem 
given the current negative findings in the prediction condition.  If one could improve the 
tasks by removing other potential limiting performance factors, and then document 
competence after both imperatives and predictions (and for both actor critique and 
speaker critique), this would show children can track the different directions-of-fit and 
their normative implications despite superficial ambiguities.   
Now, one such potential factor in the current study was the dependent measure: 
A fundamental problem, in particular in the prediction condition, was the high rate of 
ambiguous responses, i.e. forms of critique that could not be unambiguously assigned to 
one of the two puppets.  Now, these responses might reflect children’s lacking 
understanding of the normative structure of predictions.  Alternatively, however, the 
measure might have been too insensitive to uncover children’s true competence and thus 
might have underestimated children’s understanding. 
Study 2b, thus, followed up on the first study with a modified methodology that 
aimed to disambiguate children’s responses.  The same basic scenarios were used, but 
3.2 Study 2b 




instead of the verbal protest measure a forced choice paradigm was introduced: children 
were asked to decide which of the puppets made a mistake.  Thereby the focus of the 
elicited response was changed from detecting errors in general to the more specific 
determination of where in the puppets’ play the error had occurred. 
3.2.1 Method 
Participants. A different sample of fourty-eight 4-year-olds (48– 59 months, mean 
age = 54 months, 24 boys) was recruited from the same local database as in Study 2a (11 
additional children were excluded from the final sample, three due to uncooperative 
behavior, four for not passing the training phase, four due to experimenter errors or 
technical failure).  Children were native German speakers, came from diverse 
socioeconomic backgrounds and were tested either in their daycare centers or in the 
child lab facilities. 
3.2.2 Design & Procedure 
Warm-Up. As in Study 2a, the rationale for the warm-up phase was to familiarize 
children with the fact that there might be verbal and/or action mistakes on the parts of 
the puppets.  
The only modification compared to Study 2a aimed at shifting the focus from the 
detection of puppets’ errors in general towards a specific differentiation between correct 
and incorrect actions of the two puppets. Hence, the exact same warm-up games as in 
Study 2a were used but with the difference that in Study 2b the puppets always played 
together performing comparable actions.  In case of the picture book, the puppets both 
claimed that they knew the book already, and therefore each stated its opinion on what 
picture would appear on the next page, in advance.  That means the puppets played two 
rounds, both times making divergent utterances about which picture would show up, and 
with each puppet predicting the outcome correctly once.  In the game with hammer and 
balls, the puppets performed simultaneously with duplicate apparatuses.  Again, this 
game was played for two rounds with one puppet pushing the correct ball while the other 
simultaneously made a mistake by hammering on the wrong color (roles were 
alternated). 




To establish the forced choice paradigm, after each round E1 presented two cards 
to the child, each depicting one of the puppets together with a speech bubble (or with a 
hammer in hand, respectively (for details regarding the material, see Appendix S2-B).  E1 
then explained: “Look at these cards.  This is the sheep saying something (or: the sheep 
hammering) and here is the hedgehog saying something (or: the hedgehog hammering).  
Show me what was wrong!” Dependent on the child’s readiness to point to the correct 
card, E1 used up to three additional prompts in order to encourage the child to respond 
in form of pointing to one of the cards.  Four children failed to report on the mistake by 
pointing to the cards, and were therefore excluded from the final sample. 
Test game. Design and procedure of the test game were identical to Study 2a, 
except for two changes: first, the object-container pairs were changed into sets of two-
dimensional sorting games in order to facilitate children’s handling of containers.  This 
afforded children to choose one out of only two possible containers (e.g. the puzzle with 
round holes for marbles or the one where cubic objects fit in).  Second, after the puppets 
performance in each trial E1 presented two cards to the child, similarly to the warm-up 
phase; the speech act-card showed the respective puppet with a speech bubble, the 
action-card showed the actor puppet manipulating the slide. The cards were placed in 
front of the corresponding room of the puppet house, i.e. if, say, the sheep was the 
speaker and in the left room, then the sheep’s speech act card on the left, and the 
hedgehog’s action card on the right from the child’s point of view.  As children were used 
to the pointing task from the warm-up already, E1 only looked at the cards (alternating 
her gaze between the pictures) asking “Show me what was wrong!”.  Or, in case of a child 
responding verbally however, she insisted “Just show me what was wrong!”.  As in Study 
2a, children received a total of eight trials, four future-assertive (prediction) and four 
future-directive (imperative) trials which were presented in successive blocks.  The order 
of blocks, the assignment of games to conditions, and the order of the puppet’s roles 
within each block (speaker vs. actor, alternating over trials) were counterbalanced across 
children. 
Coding. Children’s responses were coded as pointing to the speech act-card or to 
the action-card (or as behavior that did not fall in either of these categories if children did 
not point at all, or failed to follow the forced choice in some other way (which was very 




rare)).  In case a child’s first response was not a clear pointing gesture (e.g. moving the 
hand over both cards while pointing) or in case of a child switching from her first choice 
to the other card, E1 repeated her request up to two times until the child produced a 
clear response which was then coded as the child’s final and valid decision.   
The directed hypotheses and rationale for the statistical analyses were the same 
as in Study 2a. 
3.2.3 Results & Discussion 
For each child, for each of the decisions (speech act-card / action-card) and the 
non-decisions, sum scores across the four trials per condition were computed.  The 
means of these sum scores as a function of condition and order of test blocks are 
depicted in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8.  Responses to mismatches in Study 2b (forced-choice measure).  Mean sum scores of trials 
(0-4) with each type of decision (choice of picture depicting speech act, action, or no decision) as a 
function of condition (Prediction, Imperative) and order of test blocks (conditions were presented in 
blocks, with the order counterbalanced). 
 
Preliminary analyses suggested clear order effects: 2 (condition; within subjects) X 
2 (order of test blocks; between subjects) mixed-factors ANOVAs on the mean number of 
trials with actor-card-decisions and speaker-card-decisions, respectively, yielded a 




significant condition X order of test block interaction effect in the case of actor-card-
decisions (F(1, 46) = 18.94, p < .001, ηp² = .29) and speaker-card-decisions (F(1, 46) = 
15.68. p < .001, ηp² = .25). Children’s performance in the second block was significantly 
influenced by their behavior in the first block and was thus difficult to interpret.  Why 
children showed this order effect we cannot tell from the present data.  One possibility is 
that it was simply due to response perseveration: Given that the present tasks pose quite 
some performance demands, for example on working memory (keeping track of who said 
what when, and who did what when), children might have been overwhelmed after a 
while and simply stuck to previously successful answers (always pointing to the speaker-
card or always to the actor-card).  Alternatively, children might have suffered from more 
cognitive perseveration: after some trials in which there were always speech act 
mistakes, for example, they might have found it difficult to disengage from thinking of the 
speech act – action mismatches as due to mistakes on the part of the speaker.  
Subsequently, in the fashion of Piagetian assimilation, they then overgeneralized their 
mini-theory that truthfully captured the first trials (e.g. “speakers are always wrong 
here”) inappropriately to trials in the second block.  Clearly, future research is needed to 
explore these possibilities.   
Regarding subsequent data processing, the focus for statistical analyses was on 
the more valid data of first test block (now in a between-subjects design such that half of 
the subjects was tested in the imperative condition and the other half in the prediction 
condition). First, analyses of children’s choice of card within each condition revealed a 
significantly higher rate of speech act than action card choices in the prediction condition 
(t(23) = -1.89, p < .05, d = .77) and the reverse pattern in the imperative condition (t(23) = 
3.82, p < .001, d = 1.56).  These results were confirmed by non-parametric analyses for 
the prediction condition (Wilcoxon test, T = 178, p < .05, r = .36), and for the imperative 
condition (Wilcoxon test, T = 38, p < .01, r = .61).  Second, analyses of each type of choice 
as a function of condition revealed that the action-card was chosen more often by 
children in the imperative condition than by children in prediction condition, t(46) = 3.89, 
p < .001, d = 1.15.  Analogously, the speech act-card was chosen more often in the 
prediction condition than in the imperative condition, t(46) = 3.89, p < .001, d = 1.13.  
Again, non-parametric tests confirmed these results for speech act card choices in the 




imperative and prediction condition (Mann Whitney U-test, U = 440.5, z = 3.28, p < .001, r 
= .47) and for action-card choices, respectively (Mann Whitney U-test, U = 133.5, z = 3.33, 
p < .001, r = .48). 
In sum, then, the modified response measure introduced in Study 2b succeeded in 
eliminating the high rate of ambiguous responses reported in Study 2a: the clear results 
for direction of fit recognition in situations of mismatches between imperative speech 
acts and actions were replicated in Study 2b.  And now the rather unclear pattern of 
responses in the prediction conditions found in Study 2a turned into a distinct preference 
to recognize the speech act as source of the mismatch in future-assertive trials of Study 
2b. 
The present findings show that by four years of age, children have developed a 
basic understanding of the underlying normative structure of future-directed speech acts 
with opposing direction of fit.  They differentially track mismatches between the content 
of speech acts and temporally successive events in the world and are ready to intervene 
appropriately: In case of imperatives, the majority of children verbally criticized (Study 2a) 
and pointed to (Study 2b) the actor for being responsible for the mismatch.  In the case of 
predictions, they criticized the speaker more often than they did after unfulfilled 
imperatives (Study 2a); and they explicitly identified the speaker as the source of the 
mistake under conditions of suitable prompting (Study 2b).  In sum, the present results 
demonstrate that children understand that thoughts and speech acts have specific 
normative outreach into the future as a function of their direction of fit.  And they 
demonstrate this at a much earlier age than suggested by previous research on speech 
act development.  Probably this difference in findings between the present and previous 
studies is partly due to the very different methodologies: in contrast to the verbal 
interviews based on complex narratives in earlier work, the present studies used a much 
simpler action-based methodology.  Another reason might be that the contrast pair 
between other-directed speech acts used here (predictions versus imperatives) might be 
inherently easier to grasp than the contrast between first person future-directed speech 
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acts (predictions versus promises) that has mostly been studied in previous work (see 
below).   
The present findings add to previous research in several ways: regarding children’s 
grasp of normativity, they add to our knowledge that children understand the logical 
difference between different synchronic directions of fit of different speech acts by 
showing that children understand the diachronic normative structure of direction of fit 
over time.  Regarding temporal cognition, they add to our knowledge of the development 
of thinking about matters in time by revealing the normative side of early future-oriented 
thought.  Children understood that thought and speech can reach out into the future in 
normative ways: actions at one time can normatively bind and commit agents over time. 
Relatedly, it remains to be explored in future studies how sophisticated and 
flexible the tracking of trans-temporal normative relations as documented here is.  First, 
the distance that the speech acts reached out into the future in the present studies was 
in fact small, as the speech acts referred to the rather immediate future.  This is in 
contrast to much research on mental time travel and temporal cognition, in which 
planning for and mentally traveling to the more distant future is investigated.  It thus 
remains to be clarified whether similar cognitive foundations underlie these different 
forms of thinking about the future differing in the temporal distance between present 
and future.  Second, the studies here suggest that children track the normative relations 
between one person’s speech act at time 1 and another person’s actions at time 2.  An 
obvious question regards the relations within one person between her words today and 
her deeds tomorrow.  When do children develop an understanding of the analogous 
difference in normative structure between first-person predictions (“When the wind 
comes, I will fall off my bike”) and promises/declarations of intention (“When the summer 
comes, I will cut my hair”)?  This, it should be noted, is very difficult to study in an equally 
stringent way for practical reasons: It is very difficult to find plausible scenarios where the 
very same propositional content “I will X” can be used to declare an intention and make a 
prediction.  Typically, “I will” is used to declare an intention when X is a verb for an 
intentional action (“cut one’s hair”) and is used to merely make a prediction when X is a 
verb for a mere happening (“fall off one’s bike”). 




A broader open question is how children come to represent intentional normative 
self-binding over time in its complex subtleties.  Our intentional states and speech acts 
today do have normative implications for actions tomorrow and do bind us and others 
over time – but they do not do so in inflexible and slavish ways (e.g. Bratman, 1984).  We 
can change our minds.  Correspondingly, it is one thing not to live up to one’s own or 
others’ standards set yesterday by failing to fulfill one’s past future-directed intention or 
another’s reasonable request.  It is quite another thing, though, to give up an intention 
one had or to decide not to comply with a request.  In all of these cases there are 
mismatches between mental states/speech acts at time 1 and actions at time 2 – but only 
in the former cases are there any mistakes involved. 
  




4 STUDY 3:  TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING 
The focus of Study 3 was on children’s understanding of temporal perspective.  
The study’s aims were twofold: firstly, we aimed to test for children’s ability to represent 
different perspectives on the temporal succession of events (temporal perspective 
taking). To this end, two newly designed tasks presented children with two characters 
that moved in opposite spatial directions of a scenario and therefore perceived objects in 
different temporal orders on their way. Children were either asked to infer the event 
sequence seen by one of the characters, or to determine the character’s current location 
on the basis of a given sequence. Secondly, we aimed to explore correlations of children’s 
temporal perspective taking with their understanding of perspective in other domains. 
Therefore, in addition to the new temporal tasks, children also received standard 
perspective taking tasks from the mental and visual domain. 
Participants.  Sixty children between the age of 3.5 and 5.5 years (40 – 66 months, 
mean age = 55 months, 25 girls) were tested.  Four additional children were excluded 
from the final sample, either because of answering control questions incorrectly (two 
girls, one boy, 39 - 41 months old), or because of uncooperative behavior (one girl, 65 
months old).  Children came from a mixed socioeconomic background and were tested in 
a separate room of their daycare centers.  Parents gave their written consent prior to 
testing. 
Children were tested on five perspective taking tasks (two temporal, two mental 
and one visual) and two covariates (mental rotation and vocabulary).  All tasks were 
presented within one session (together with two additional tests that were part of a 
different project). Altogether a session took 30 to 45 minutes.  Throughout testing 
children were seated at a table together with the experimenter (E).  Tasks were 
administered in three blocks of fixed order. The order of tasks within blocks was 
counterbalanced only in test block 3. Additionally, the presentation order of the two 
temporal tasks was counterbalanced across blocks 2 and 3 (see Table 2).  All sessions 
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started with assessment of the two covariates (block 1: the vocabulary test first, then 
mental rotation) and proceeded with a mental perspective taking task first (change of 
location), followed by one temporal (path or carousel, counterbalanced) and the visual 
perspective taking task (block 2). In test block 3 either the second mental perspective 
taking task (unexpected content) preceded a temporal task (path or carousel), or vice 
versa. 
 




2 perspective taking (1) 
mental change of location 
temporal path OR carousel 
visual task 




path OR carousel 
Table 2.  Order of task presentation. Systematically varied elements are gray-shaded. 
 
Temporal perspective taking tasks.  Two tasks were newly designed in order to 
assess children’s temporal perspective taking skills.  Each task was presented in two 
subsequent trials with each trial involving a story that was read out by E and visually 
accompanied by an animated slideshow on a notebook computer. At the end of each trial 
E posed two test questions about the story’s characters (or objects) that were depicted 
on the slides. Children responded by selectively pointing towards one of the elements on 
the screen. The order of tasks and trials presented within each task was fixed. 
In the path task children were introduced to the main setup on the presentation’s 
first slide: the graphic of a path connecting four lineally arranged pictures (from the right 
to the left side on the screen, e.g.: a house, a wood, a bridge and another house, see 
Figure 9). In the training phase, two animal characters appeared and moved on the path, 
consecutively, with the first moving, e.g., from the right house to the left (training, part 1) 
and the other from the left house to the right (training, part 2). After naming all elements 
on the screen, E described the animations simultaneously (in case of a right-to-left 
animation E would say, e.g.: “The dog wants to take a walk. Now it walks on the path: it 




passes the wood - and walks over the bridge – into the house.”).  After the character had 
disappeared ‘in the house’, E asked two control questions in order make the child repeat 
the perceived event order, e.g. “What came first, the wood or the bridge? What came 
after it?” (For the original script, see Appendix S3).  Subsequent to the child answering 
correctly, E always repeated the order using the term ‘before’, e.g.: “Ok, the wood came 
before the bridge”.  E’s descriptions - and also the required answers to E’s questions - 
differed accordingly for the other character that moved into the opposite direction.  The 
training phase was repeated up to two times in case a child didn’t give correct answers on 
the first presentation.  
 
Figure 9.  Scenario of the path task (picture from training phase). 
 
In the test phase two new characters appeared below the path and the whole 
scenario was occluded by a huge cloud just before the characters were expected to start 
moving and take a walk on it (see Figure 10).  Instead of the visual input, children now 
heard sounds of footsteps with E suggesting to hear them walk on the path: “Oh, now we 
can’t see the way they are walking! But do you hear the footsteps?”.  After the clapping of 
a door was heard twice, sounds stopped and the cloud disappeared, revealing the main 
setup again with no characters visible. Suggesting that the characters “have already 
arrived” and asking herself where they might be, E provided a statement of each 
character as a hint for the child, e.g. “Lucy says, the wood came before the bridge. Theo 
says, the bridge came before the wood.” Finally, E asked the child two test questions (Q1, 
Q2), first repeating each statement, e.g.: 
Q1 “Theo says, the bridge came before the wood. Where is Theo?” 
Q2 “Lucy says, the wood came before the bridge. Where is Lucy?” 




E waited for the child to respond to the first question before posing the second.  
Both trials of the path task employed the above structure and scenario of a horizontal 
path.  Trials differed in the pictures and characters presented, and in the order of spatial 
directions mentioned in the test questions (first asking for the left-side target in trial 1, 
and the right-side target in trial 2). 
 
Figure 10.  Test phase of the path task (pictures from left to right): (1) characters intend to walk on the 
path, (2) characters walking on the path are occluded by a cloud, (3) cloud has gone and characters 
have arrived inside the houses. 
 
In contrast to the path task, where linear movements of opposing directions 
caused different perspectives on the occurrence of events, in the carousel task this 
difference originated from characters’ different positions on a carousel.  On the first 
presentation slide children saw the top view of a carousel whose real model was 
presented to them on the ground next to them. After assuring that children understood 
the pictorial representation of the carousel, E removed the model and directed children’s 
attention to the notebook.  Above and below the carousel two landmarks (e.g. 
playground and farm) were depicted (see Figure 11). In the training phase children 
learned (1) that each ride on the carousel would only take one round and (2) that the 
order of the two landmarks that a passenger witnessed passing by was dependent on her 
position at start (e.g. sitting on the tractor: playground first, then farm, sitting on the 
pony: farm first, then playground), see Appendix S3 for the original script. Two control 
questions tested whether children were able to reproduce the order of events for both 
positions. 
In the test phase two characters appeared and were just about to take a ride on 
the carousel, when (similar to the path task) a rain cloud occluded the carousel (see 
Figure 11). After it had disappeared children were told that the characters had already 
taken their seat, but it was impossible to see who sat where, due to two large umbrellas 




that now covered the characters on the carousel.  After the carousel had gone one round 
E asked who sat where. Previous to the first test question, she provided a character’s 
statement as a hint for the child, e.g.: 
Q1 “Sarah says, the playground came first. Do you know where Sarah is?”. 
After the child had answered the first test question, the umbrellas disappeared, 
revealing the actual positions of the characters. E directed the child’s attention to the 
position of second character and posed the second test question, e.g.: 
Q2 “If we ask Tim ‘What came first?’, what will Tim say?” 
A second trial resembled the above structure and differed only in the given 
landmarks and characters, and in the target sides of the test questions (i.e., compared to 
trial 1, targeting at the opposite side in the first and at the opposite landmark in second 
question). 
 
Figure 11.  Scenario of the carousel task, test phase (pictures from left to right): (1) characters intend 
to ride on the carousel, (2) characters taking their seats are occluded by a cloud, (3) cloud has gone 
and characters are seated beneath umbrellas.  
 
Coding.  In the temporal perspective taking tasks, both children’s pointing towards 
one of the pictures on the screen, or naming of a picture was coded as a valid response. 
In case an answer was not clear, or in case a child pointed to none or more than one 
picture on the screen, E repeated the character’s statements and test questions up to 
two times.  In case a child failed to answer the control questions correctly after the third 
completion of the training phase, E skipped this trial in order prevent the child from 
frustration. A sum score was computed over those trials where the training phase was 




completed successfully (valid trials).  Scores ranged from 0 to 4 for the path task and 0 to 
4 for the carousel task. 
Mental perspective taking tasks.  Two standard false belief tasks were used to 
assess children’s ability to represent mental perspectives. 
The change of location false belief task, after Wimmer and Perner (1983), was 
enacted by E as a puppet play in front of the child: a puppet (A) deposited an object in 
one of two boxes before she left the scene.  In her absence the object was transferred by 
another puppet (B) into the other box.  Before A returned the child was asked three 
control questions: (1) “Where did A put the object first?”, (2) “Where is the object now?”, 
(3) “Who put it there?”. When A returned, children were asked the test question: “What 
does A think where the object is?”.  The procedure of the task was repeated up to two 
times in case a child didn’t answer the control questions correctly on the first try. 
In the unexpected content false belief task (Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987) 
children were presented with a candy box and shown that it contains (unlike their 
guessing) a pen instead of candy. Test questions targeted both at first and third person 
perspectives on the box’s content: (1)“Initially, before you looked into the box, what did 
you think was in the box?”, (2) “If we show your friend [name of friend] the box, what 
does she/he think is in the box?”.  A control question finally asked children to reproduce 
the actual content of the box.   
Children’s responses to test questions were scored only if they had answered the 
control questions correctly. Correct answers were summed up to a total score for mental 
perspective taking, ranging from 0 to 3. 
Visual perspective taking task.  Modified versions of the tasks presented by 
Hamilton et al. (2009) were used to assess children’s visual perspective taking skills, and 
also their ability to mentally rotate an object’s orientation.  As a covariate the latter will 
be presented further below. 
The same materials were used for the visual perspective taking task and the 
mental rotation task and children therefore received only one training phase for both 
tasks: a square turntable with differently colored edges was placed in front of the child. A 




toy was placed on the turntable facing the child. On a cardboard depicting four different 
orientations of the toy (front, back, left and right side), the child was asked first to point 
to the picture that matched the child’s current view, and again after turntable (and toy) 
were rotated 90°. Finally, the toy was covered with an opaque box and the child was 
asked again to choose the picture depicting the toy’s current orientation. In case a child 
did not answer all three questions correctly, E gave feedback on the correct picture and 
repeated the procedure up to two times with new toys. E did not proceed to the test 
phase in case of a child failing to answer the three questions correctly in the training 
phase. 
In the test phase three new toys were placed on the turntable in three 
consecutive trials (1. a pig oriented with its back to the child, 2. an elephant facing the 
child, and 3. a frog oriented left). In each trial a puppet was placed at one of the other 
sides of the turntable (1. at the left, 2. opposite, and 3. at the right side of the child). 
Children were asked to indicate on the cardboard (1) the side of the toy they see 
themselves (control) and (2) the side that the puppet sees (test question).  If children 
gave an incorrect answer to one control question this trial was excluded from the 
analyses.  If a child failed to answer more control questions correctly data from this task 
was excluded. The order of toys presented, their orientation and the puppet’s orientation 
was fixed. Children received a total score for visual perspective taking ranging from 0 to 3. 
Covariates.  A task similar to the visual perspective taking task was used to assess 
children’s skill in mental rotation (Hamilton et al., 2009). For a description of the materials 
used and the training phase see the section above. In the test phase the three toys were 
placed on the turntable, again in three consecutive trials and in three different 
orientations (1. the pig oriented left, 2. the elephant with its back to the child, and 3. the 
frog facing the child).  In each trial, after the toy was covered with the opaque box, 
children were asked (1) to indicate on the cardboard the orientation of the toy under the 
box.  In case a child didn’t answer the control question correctly, E lifted the box for a 
moment and then posed the question again. (2) E rotated the turntable and asked the 
test question: “When I lift the box, which side of [the toy] will you see?”.  Rotations were 
90°-right in the first, 180°-right in the second, and 90°-left in the third trial. For each trial 
children’s pointing to one of the four pictures on the cardboard was coded as response, 




resulting in a total score of 0 to 3 for this task. The order of toys presented, their initial 
position and rotation was fixed. 
In order to assess children’s verbal skills, a vocabulary test (Kaufmann & 
Kaufmann, 1999) was presented to each child at the beginning of the session. Children’s 
task was to name the pictures of 24 items. A correct name was scored 1, resulting in a 
total score of 0 to 24. 
4.3.1 Temporal perspective taking tasks 
Sum scores were computed over the 2 test questions for each trial and task.  
These were divided by the number of valid test questions. A trial was considered correct 
in case the resulting proportional score equaled the value of 1. Subsequently, 
proportional scores were computed over both trials for each task resulting in a 
proportion-correct score (out of two trials) for the path and the carousel task (see Figure 
12).  One child (40 months) was excluded from the analyses due to not answering control 
questions correctly in either task. 
Chance level for solving a task (answering two trials correctly) was 25%.  One 
sample t-tests on the mean proportional scores (against the value of .25) revealed that 
children’s overall performance did not differ from chance in the carousel task (p = .07, 
two-tailed) but children performed significantly above chance level in the path task (p < 
.01).  In order to check for age differences the sample was split into three age groups of 
3-year-olds (N = 13, 40-47 months), 4-year-olds (N = 23, 48-59 months), and 5-year-olds 
(N = 23, 60-66 months).  A two-way ANOVA, with task-correct proportional scores (path, 
carousel) X age group (3-, 4-, 5-year-olds) yielded a significant main effect of task (F(1, 54) 
= 7.97, p < .01, ηp² = .13). Subsequent t-test on performances of each age group 
suggested that this effect resulted from 3- and 4-year-old’s lower performance in the 
carousel task. In this task only the 5-year-olds performed above chance (p < .01), whereas 
in the path task all groups were above chance level (see Figure 12).  Subsequent analysis 
focused on the question why children of all age groups apparently succeeded on the path 
task while the younger groups failed to solve the carousel task. 
4.3 Results 




Figure 12.  Mean proportions (trials correct out of two) in the temporal perspective taking tasks for 
each age group (chance level = .25, two tailed levels of significance). 
 
The path task.  A qualitative inspection of the data (59 children included, six of 
them with one trial only) was performed to reveal individual response patterns.  First of 
all, success rates did not differ between trials in the path task (46% of all children solved 
trial 1, 55% trial 2), but individual performance was inconsistent for half of the sample 
(with 26 children out of 53 solving only one trial, see Table 3).  In order to clarify this 
inconsistency, a within-trials analysis revealed (1) that answers to Q2 largely depended on 
answers to Q1 in both trials (see Table 4), and (2) that approximately half of the children 
chose the correct side in response to the first trial’s Q1.  The first finding makes pragmatic 
sense in that children simply chose the opposite side in Q2 to that chosen in Q1. The 
second finding raises the question if the one half of children that succeeded on trial 1 
exhibited true competence on the task or if their success was simply due to guessing (i.e. 
guessing correctly in Q1 combined with strategically switching sides in Q2).  Crucially, the 
target side of Q1 was alternated over trials.  A comparison of responses to Q1 over trials, 
therefore, would show if children answered this question systematically correct.  In fact 
only 57% of children who answered Q1 correctly in trial 1 were also correct in trial 2 (17 
children out of 30), the remaining 13 children persevered their responses (choosing the 
same side in Q1 in both trials).  This observation might be taken to suggest that correct 
responses were rather nonsystematic, and more likely due to guessing strategies, though 
the picture becomes clearer when differences between age groups are considered: only 
18% of the 3-year-olds, 14% of the 4-year-olds, but 43% of the 5-year-olds solved both 




trials of the task correctly (answering Q1 and Q2 correctly in both trials), see Table 5.  
Therefore, it was concluded that in the path task some competence was found in the 








correct 14 11 25 
incorrect 15 13 28 
total 29 24 53 
Table 3.  Response patterns in the path task, absolute numbers of children giving correct/ incorrect 







correct 25 5 30 
incorrect 1 23 24 
total 26 28 54 
Trial 2   
Q1 
correct 32 1 33 
incorrect 3 22 25 
total 35 23 58 
Table 4.  Responses to question 1 and 2 (crossed) separately for trial 1 and trial 2 (over all age groups). 
Absolute numbers depicted. 
 







3-year-olds (N=11) 2 (18%) 7 (64%) 2 (18%) 
4-year-olds (N=21) 7 (33%) 11 (52%) 3 (14%) 
5-year-olds (N=21) 4 (19%) 8 (38%) 9 (43%) 
Table 5.  Absolute numbers of children (in age groups) solving none, one, or both trials of the path task 
correctly. 




The carousel task.  Data of 59 children were analyzed for the carousel tasks. From three 
children only one trial went into the analysis because they failed to answer control 
questions correctly in the other trial.   
In contrast to the path task the two questions (Q1, Q2) asked within a trial in the 
carousel task did not only target at two alternative sides, but asked for the location of a 
character (left/ right side) on the carousel (Q1), and for the object seen first (i.e. the event 
order perceived) by another character (top/ bottom of the screen) (Q2).  In order to 
detect potential differences in responses to the two types of questions, sum scores over 
trials were computed for each type of question (Q1, Q2) and were then converted into 
proportional scores ranging from 0 to 1, by dividing the sums by the number of valid trials 
(1-2). A 2 (type of question: Q1, Q2) X 3 (age groups) mixed factors ANOVA yielded a 
significant main effect of type of question (F(1, 55) = 12.78, p = .001, ηp² = .19).  
Subsequent t-tests revealed that overall, questions of type 2 were answered correctly 
significantly more often than type 1 questions (paired samples t(58) = -3.66, p = .001), 
and also significantly more often than expected by chance, with 45% of children solving 
both Q2 questions correctly (p < .01), see Table 6.  A subsequent differentiation of age 
groups, revealed that success on Q2 questions was due to the performance of the 5-year-
olds which was significantly higher than 4-year-olds’ performance (independent samples 
t(44) = -2.83, p < .01), see Figure 13 for percentages of children in each age group that 







correct 7 28 35 
incorrect 7 14 21 
total 14 42 56 
Q2   
Trial 1 
correct 25 12 37 
incorrect 11 8 19 
total 36 20 56 
Table 6.  Responses to question 1 and question 2 in the carousel task, crossed for trial 1 and trial 2. 
Absolute numbers depicted. 
 




Figure 13.  Percentage of children (per age group) solving questions of type 1 (Q1) and type 2 (Q2) 
correctly in both trials of the carousel tasks. 
 
Figure 14.  Mean proportions of correct answers by type of question and trial, in the carousel task. 
 
Lower performance in type 1 questions (Q1) was due to a significant drop in trial 2 
compared to trial 1 (t(55) = 4.0, p < .01, see Figure 14).  A possible reason for this drop 
was identified by a closer examination of the task’s structure: questions of type 1 (e.g. 
“Sarah says the playground was first. Do you know where Sarah is?”) were primed in the 
training phase that preceded each trial (see methods section).  Crucially, the order of 
events presented during training was fixed but the target of Q1 was alternated over trials 




to the end that the last sequence children had seen in the training phase matched the 
sequence E asked for in Q1 in the first trial, but inferring the opposite sequence was 
correct in trial 2. Therefore it is likely that responses to Q1 in the two trials reflect a carry-
over effect from training to test phase possibly resulting in false-positive results for trial 1 
and false-negatives in trial 2. 
Preliminary conclusions.  The tasks described and analyzed above do not provide 
evidence for children’s competence in temporal perspective taking: qualitative 
inspections of the path task revealed that especially younger children’s responses were 
primarily driven by pure guessing, combined with (i) the strategy to choose the 
alternative of the first in their second response and (ii) perseveration of responses from 
the first to the second trial. In the carousel task children’s competence was possibly 
masked by a bias to transfer the preceding training situation to the following test (Q1). 
Still, hints of children’s competence were found in 5-year-olds who performed 
over chance level in specific parts of the tasks: in the path task 43% of 5-year-olds 
answered the first test question (Q1) correctly in both trials, whereas in the carousel task 
65% succeeded on the second question in both trials (Q2). 
4.3.2 Correlations  
Perspective taking tasks and covariates.  For a comparison of the perspective 
taking tasks, sum scores of correct answers were divided by the number of valid trials in 
each task, resulting in proportional scores ranging from 0 to 1.   
For the visual perspective taking task preliminary analyses indicated that 
children’s performance differed significantly in trials 1 and 2 (paired samples t-tests on 
mean sums t(59) = -7.46, p < .001), and in trials 2 an 3 (t(57) = 5.51, p < .001) with only 
28% of children solving trial 1 where the puppet sat 90° left to the child, 80% solving trial 
2 with 180° angle, and 41% solving trial 3 (90° right).  In fact classical tasks only test for 
180° visual perspective taking (e.g. Flavell et al., 1981), which most of the children 
mastered in our task.  In order to balance the weight of the more difficult 90° trials only 
scores of trial 2 (180°) and trial 3 (90°) were used to compute the proportional score for 
visual perspective taking.  A proportional score for mental rotation was computed from 




(at most three) valid trials.  For mental perspective taking a pooled score was obtained by 
averaging over proportional scores of the change of location and the unexpected content 
false belief tasks.  For the vocabulary test total sum scores went into the analysis.  See 
mean values for all tasks in Table 7.   
 
task N mean (SE) SD 
vocabulary 60 16.15 (.38) 3.0 
PT temporal - path 59 0.55 (.08) .37 
 - carousel 59 0.53 (.04) .27 
PT mental 56 0.72 (.03) .26 
PT visual 58 0.6 (.05) .37 
mental rotation  58 0.36 (.04) .29 
Table 7.  Mean values for each task (PT = perspective taking). 
 
Children’s performance in the path task was not related with the carousel task (r = 
.09) and neither of the temporal tasks correlated with measures of the other perspective 
taking tasks (see Table 8).  There was a significant correlation of mental and visual 
perspective taking tasks that remained marginally significant after age and vocabulary 
were controlled for (r = .27, p = .05).  As expected visual perspective taking did not 
correlate with mental rotation.  However, there was a weak positive relationship between 
mental rotation and the temporal perspectives path task (r = .27).   
 
 Vocabulary PT temporal - path 
PT temporal - 






































PT temporal - 












PT visual      
.11/ .09 
(57) 
Table 8.  Raw / partial correlations with valid numbers of subjects (N) for perspective taking tasks 
(different domains: PT temporal, PT visual, PT mental), mental rotation and controls (age, vocabulary). 
One-tailed levels of significance: * p < .05, ** p < .01. 




The present study aimed at investigating temporal perspective taking and its 
possible relation with other domains of perspective taking in preschool children.  To this 
end, three- to five-year-old children were tested on two tasks that were developed in 
order to provide new measures for children’s ability to mentally decenter from the 
present and to coordinate different perspectives on the temporal succession of events.  
Furthermore, performance in these new tasks was correlated with children’s skill in 
solving standard visual and mental perspective taking problems.   
Results indicate that the new tasks did not produce reliable data on children’s 
grasp of temporal perspective; children’s responses were explained by the use of 
guessing strategies in combination with pragmatic alternation within, and perseveration 
of responses across trials in the path task.  In the carousel task carry-over effects from 
training to test phases were found.  For the above reasons retest reliability from trial 1 to 
trial 2 cannot be assumed for either of the tasks.  Therefore, tasks can also not be 
considered as valid tests. 
However, some competence was found in the oldest age group where more 
children than expected by chance (43%) solved both trials of the path task correctly by 
flexibly adapting their responses over trials to the alternated targets.  In the carousel 
tasks 5-year-olds were above chance performance in answering Q2, correctly judging (for 
different targets and in both trials) which landmark a character would have seen first on 
the basis of the character’s current position on the carousel.  But do correct answers to 
this question alone allow for concluding that these children understood the character’s 
perspective on the previous event sequence?  Going back to the initial analysis of 
previous work on perspective taking and temporal decentering in children, a closer look 
at the task’s demands in comparison to demands imposed by this type of question might 
help to evaluate this part of the data appropriately. 
Based on work by Weist (1989) and Cromer (1971), one important requirement 
for temporal decentering was defined as the ability to coordinate at least two points in 
time apart from the child’s present.  This requirement was operationalized in the 
temporal tasks by the presentation of two events that were passed by a character in 
4.4 Discussion 




succession.  Coordination of these events in relation to the present was necessary, e.g. in 
type 1 questions in the carousel task, when children were asked to infer a character’s 
current position from her statement about a temporal succession (“Sarah says X was 
first.”) and from knowledge about the carousel’s movement (circular, clockwise).  Type 2 
questions in contrast asked children to determine the landmark another character must 
have seen first on the basis of her actual position on the carousel (“If we ask Tim ‘What 
came first?’, what will Tim say?”).  In this case knowledge about the direction of 
movement and the character’s current position is sufficient to infer the landmark passed 
first.  Therefore, this task can be solved quasi online from a present point of view by e.g. 
imagining the landmark that will be (!) visited next.  Representing a third point in time is 
not particularly necessary.  
The second requirement for perspective understanding followed a definition by 
Perner et al. (2003) and was defined as the ability to represent different perspectives on 
the same referent(s) simultaneously.  This requirement was implemented in our tasks by 
differing spatial positions or movements of two characters that caused a difference in 
their (simultaneously formed) perceptions of the occurrence of two events.  Representing 
this difference was necessary e.g. in the path task when statements that were 
incompatible at first view (A says: X before Y.  B says: Y before X.) had to be combined 
with knowledge about the possibly opposite directions of movement and the 
consequential difference in event-order representations.  But in case of the carousel task 
answering the second question alone [What will B say what came first?] did not require 
integration of incompatible statements or contradicting pieces of information.  Instead, 
again, a simple heuristic based on non-temporal, presently available information on the 
character’s position and knowledge about the carousel’s direction of movement would 
have been sufficient to infer the nearest landmark and to answer this type of question 
correctly. 
With respect to the correlations of perspective taking tasks from different 
domains inconclusive results in the temporal domain were expressed in the correlations 
as well.  The temporal perspective taking tasks were not related to any other task, apart 
from a weak correlation of the path task with the (non-perspective) mental rotation task 
which might have been an artefact.  Replicating a previous study from Hamilton and 




colleagues the methodologically similar level 2 visual perspective taking task and the 
mental rotation task were not related.  As expected, the standard mental and visual 
perspective taking tasks adapted from the literature correlated with each other.  
An important question that is raised by the present study - and that needs to be 
tackled in the future - concerns the validity of tasks measuring the understanding of 
temporal perspective.  As discussed earlier, it is very likely that performance in the two 
temporal perspective taking tasks used in this study was biased (carousel task) or driven 
by guessing strategies (path task).  Negative results in these tasks do not provide valid 
evidence for children’s lack of competence.  Therefore, this study has to leave open both 
the question of young children’s understanding of temporal perspective and of the 
possible developmental relation between perspective taking skills in different domains. 
Future research will have to explore further ways of designing tasks that directly 
tap children’s temporal perspective taking skills.  Determining the kind of contradicting 
representations in these tasks will not be a trivial endeavor: the necessary condition of 
such representations being simultaneously valid while referring to the same referent(s), 
rules out the possibility of e.g. representing an object that changes its external state over 
time.  In this case an earlier representation of the referent (e.g. a flower in full bloom) 
would be considered as “outdated” compared to the representation of a later state (e.g. 
the same flower faded).  Representations that refer to different points in time do not 
constitute perspective problems as they are by nature compatible over time (see Perner 
& Leekam, 2008).  In order to circumvent this problem imposed by the general flow of 
time, temporal perspective in the present study was interpreted in the sense of 
representing different temporal relations between two events. 
In the path and the carousel task the coupling of temporal occurrence with spatial 
direction provided an elegant way of construing temporal synchrony for the formation of 
contradicting representations.  Still, this might not be the only and ideal way of 
operationalizing temporal perspective problems.  In line with other researchers we would 
suggest that scaffolding temporal representations by translating them spatially in the 
test-setup should be advantageous for investigations of early temporal skills in children 
(see McCormack & Hoerl, 2008).  Though, it might be the case that the specific material 
used in our tasks confused or misled children somehow in their temporal reasoning.  One 




could as well argue that the verbal instructions and structure of test questions could have 
hindered children’s understanding of the tasks.  Still, compared to earlier research (e.g. 
the use of complex temporal forms in Cromer’s work) in the present study language 
demands were reduced to a minimum, and - although desirable - designing this kind of 
task completely omitting temporal language seems unfeasible.  A possible workaround in 
future projects might be to check children’s understanding of the specific temporal terms 
used prior to testing.  After all, the present research provides an important step towards 
increasing the research on temporal perspective understanding and it demonstrates a 






5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate three specific aspects of children’s 
developing temporal cognition in order to gain deeper insight into the nature of the 
underlying temporal conceptions of early temporal thought.  The following three sections 
provide an overview over the main findings regarding the aspects of temporal-causal, 
temporal-normative, and temporal perspective understanding.  Section 5.4 relates the 
results to prominent theories in the field of human temporal cognition and concludes 
with an outline of promising future research directions.  
Study Set 1 focused on children’s ability to reason flexibly about the temporal-
causal relations between events (TCR).  Following up on previous work this set of studies 
aimed to explore (i) at what age children develop robust and systematic TCR skills, (ii) if 
these skills develop synchronously for past- and future-directed thought, and (iii) if TCR is 
a qualitatively different cognitive capacity than simpler forms of keeping track of 
temporal matters.  Analogous versions of past and future event scenarios were designed 
in order to compare 4- and 6-year-olds performances in tasks of both temporal 
directions.  Furthermore, performance in the past-directed TCR tasks was compared to 
children’s ability to solve a structurally similar, object-tracking task (temporal updating).  
Results suggest (i) that fully fledged TCR develops until the age of six, while an early and 
limited form might already be present in 4-year-olds.  In both age groups (ii) symmetrical 
levels of performance were found for past- and future-oriented TCR, supporting the view 
of both skills being based on the same cognitive capacity.  Different levels of performance 
in the structurally matched TCR and updating tasks (iii) support the hypothesis that TCR is 
a qualitatively different and more sophisticated form of temporal cognition than the less 
demanding tracking (or updating) of information over time.   
Apart from the finding that the evidential structure of the task plays an important 
role in children’s temporal-causal reasoning, it was also temporal proximity that seemed 
to have an influence on children’s performance and that complicated an interpretation of 
the younger children’s performance.  In this respect, our studies leave open two possible 
interpretations: either children’s competence was masked by a bias towards temporally 





closer events, or children of this age were actually lacking competence in TCR, with their 
responses being driven primarily by heuristics and biases instead of reflecting temporal-
causal reasoning.  This ambiguity can only be resolved by future research.  Still, it is an 
interesting idea and very important for the design of further studies that a subject’s 
ability to reason about the temporal-causal relations of two events might be influenced 
by their temporal proximity relative to the subject’s present.  For human mental time 
travel (MTT) a bi-cone model of past and future representations has been suggested 
(Roberts & Feeney, 2009), with more detailed and clearer representations being 
accessible for events that are temporally closer to the subject’s present and a linear 
decline in number and detail of information for more distant past and future events.  This 
model makes sense in the context of MTT where the process of episodic thinking is 
described in terms of the subject mentally travelling from the present to past or future 
events.  But this view seems to contradict with the idea of TCR as a capacity of flexible 
and independent reasoning about temporal-causal relations of any - in particular of novel 
- events in time (McCormack & Hoerl, 2008).  That is, TCR should be applicable 
irrespective of self-conscious activity related with the events, and irrespective of the 
events’ relative temporal distance to the subject’s present.  Although Study Set 1 was 
designed with the aim of reducing the length of event-sequences to a minimum, in the 
MTT view temporal distance was larger in the prospective reasoning version that was in 
fact more difficult for the 4-year-olds (target location = obstacle 2) than the distance in 
the version that was reliably solved (target location = obstacle 1).  That is, in the latter 
task children had to mentally “travel a shorter distance” into the future.  This was 
analogous in the retrospective tasks, where the target that was closer (in the view of 
travelling the way back from the present, target location = obstacle 2) was also chosen 
more often in Study 1a und Study 1b (see also section 2.1.3).  An integrated view, 
combining both MTT and TCR theory, might therefore provide an adequate way of 
explaining the biases that influenced children’s temporal-causal reasoning in the present 







In Study Set 2 children’s understanding of the underlying normative structure of 
speech acts with future reference was investigated.  Previous research has left open the 
question if young children, before possessing an explicit concept of specific types of 
speech acts, are capable of an early, basic form of differentiating the normative 
implications of future-directed speech acts.  In order to close this gap in research, 
children were presented with speech acts of opposite directions of fit, predictions and 
imperatives, which did not match the future action they referred to.  Results indicate that 
by four years of age children understand that these types of speech acts have temporal-
normative outreach to the immediate future and they can differentiate commitments of 
speaker and actor as a function of the speech act’s direction of fit.   
It is open to future research to explore if the present findings can be extended to 
other types of speech acts, specifically to children’s understanding of past-directed 
speech acts.  These, naturally have a mind-to-world direction of fit, which is the reason 
why the paradigm used in Study Set 2 is not appropriate to approach the question of how 
children understand or differentiate past-directed speech acts. 
Another important future step in the investigation of children’s temporal-
normative understanding is, in our view, extending the temporal delay between actions 
or speech acts that originate temporally persistent commitments and the future point in 
time where they are supposed to be fulfilled.  In the present studies the temporal 
distance was very short (with the action directly following the speech act) in order to 
reduce the task’s demands.  Though, it is an interesting question if young children handle 
information over longer periods and differently as a function of the entailed normative 
force of the speech act.  That is, children might use normative implications of speech acts 
in order to form expectations also on temporally more distant events.  In our studies 
throughout a session children repeatedly experienced that the exact alternative of a 
predicted or requested event was performed later on, and many of them adapted their 
behavior in the course of the session by prepositioning the alternative container under 
the slide than the one that would match the action referred to in the speech act.  
Although in these cases the object slid by the actor in fact matched the container (i.e. it 





matched the child’s future-oriented action), children still charged the mismatch between 
the puppets’ speech act and action, accordingly.  That is, they tracked the propositional 
content of the speech act and its normative force over time, although they themselves 
did not act in compliance with it. 
It is an open question to what extent children are able to evaluate and make use 
of, e.g., the varying degrees of certainty that different speech acts imply, in order to build 
accurate representations of what is likely to happen in the future.  This competence 
would enable children to limit the number of possible future scenarios on the basis of the 
specific certainty value of information, and to determine which present actions or 
interventions might pay off in the future.  
Study 3, finally, aimed to explore the understanding of temporal perspective in relation to 
children’s perspective understanding in other domains.  Different lines of research were 
brought together by adopting and combining the concept of temporal decentering 
(Cromer, 1971; McCormack & Hoerl, 2008; Weist, 1989) and the concept of perspective 
taking (Perner et al., 2003), which resulted in the design of two new temporal perspective 
taking tasks.  These tasks interpreted temporal perspective in terms of the subjectively 
different representations of temporal order that resulted from the subjects’ opposite 
directions of movement in space.  Children additionally received standard false belief 
(mental perspective taking) and visual perspective taking tasks in order to correlate their 
performances in the different domains.  Overall, lacking validity of the newly designed 
tasks precludes any conclusion on children’s temporal perspective understanding based 
on performances in these tasks.  Likewise, conclusions on the possible developmental 
relation in perspective understanding in different domains cannot be made.  Clearly, 
future research is necessary to follow up on this preliminary attempt of testing temporal 
perspective understanding in children.  
As outlined in section 4.4 designing experimental tests for the capacity of 
temporal perspective taking is not trivial: in the ubiquitous flow of time representations 
are formed at specific points in time, and they exist diachronically while constantly 
changing temporal reference to this point in time.  My representation of a mug that I 





placed on the table this morning might turn out to be outdated when I find only 
fragments of it on the ground in the evening.  Even if I keep my outdated representation 
of the entire mug instead of updating it (e.g. because someone hides the fragments and 
prevents me from perceiving the current state of the mug), this situation would be best 
described as me having a false belief about the mug’s state (Perner & Leekam, 2008).  A 
perspective problem would be constituted only if someone else (e.g. the person who hid 
the broken mug) simultaneously represents the mug’s actual state and my false belief of 
it (Perner et al., 2003).  Though, all this is the description of a mental, not a temporal 
perspective taking problem. 
We adopted the temporal decentering account, which was  introduced by Weist 
(1989) and Cromer (1971) and put forward by (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999, 2008), to 
create temporal perspective problems in our experiments.  Instead of relating a past or 
future event to the present (like in the broken mug example), these tasks required 
children to consider the temporal relationship between two events from different 
perspectives.  The difference in perspective was resolved by the spatial direction of 
movements.  This is to say, to circumvent the situation that the general flow of time 
causes different representations of the same object, different representations of the 
perceived order of objects were created by the characters movements in space.  An 
integration of spatiotemporal information was necessary in order to resolve and 
understand the characters’ contradicting assertions.  To relate our tasks to Weist’s 
terminology, consider one of the test questions, e.g. “Theo says, the bridge came before 
the wood. Where is Theo?”.  In order to answer this question, children had to coordinate 
the following three points in time: the question (Q) targets at Theo’s current or present 
location (Q => tpresent) and the assertion (ATheo) indicates the temporal order of two events 
that Theo must have experienced in the past (passing the bridge, passing the wood) 
(ATheo: bridge = t1 and wood = t2).  In this example tpresent clearly represents the speech 
time, while we might agree on labelling t1 event time (as “bridge” is the subject) and t2 
reference time (as “wood” marks the object in this sentence).  In any case, in order to 
infer the current position of Theo correctly, children need to consider the temporal 
relation between two additional points in time in this task.  The results of Study 3 do not 





when answering this single test question, but there are indications of older children 
succeeding on this isolated part of the tasks (see section 4.3.1). 
In addition to temporal decentering, our tasks required children to integrate 
opposing perspectives on the temporal relation of the two events (e.g., ATheo vs. ALucy) in 
order to determine the different positions of characters in a scenario.  The capacity to 
simultaneously represent different perspectives on the temporal relation of the same 
events was considered a necessary component of full-blown perspective understanding.  
Future investigations will be necessary to overcome problems in the quality of measures 
for temporal perspective understanding.  To extend the present approach, further 
developed tests could even aim to differentiate levels in children’s developing 
understanding of temporal perspective in order to provide a more detailed picture of the 
different components entailed in this capacity.  
A broader question for future research concerns the cognitive and developmental 
relations of the aspects investigated here to other forms of temporal cognition.  In the 
recent literature on mental time travel (MTT) in humans and other animals, it has been 
intensively debated which types of tasks require which levels of (implicit or explicit) 
representation of time (e.g. Clayton & Russell, 2009; Hoerl & McCormack, 2011; Russell & 
Hanna, 2012).  Everyone agrees, for instance, that episodic memory involves 
representations of one’s own past.  But there has been considerable disagreement about 
the type of representation it requires: some think it requires explicit representations both 
of one’s own past events as past events and of the way they causally relate to one’s 
present memories (Perner, 2000; Tulving, 2005).  Others, in contrast, have argued that 
episodic memory is well possible without such sophisticated representational machinery.  
Instead, it need only represent explicity where, when and what happened while only 
implicitly representing the relation of these events to the present (e.g. Clayton & Russell, 
2009; Tulving, 1972).   
Results from Study Set 1 suggest that temporal-causal reasoning (TCR) about past 
and future events emerges by age four and develops until the end of the preschool years.  
This is in line with findings from work on MTT suggesting that around the same time 
children acquire analogous competence in both episodic memory and episodic foresight 





to act upon past experiences and plan competently for the future (Suddendorf et al., 
2011; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  Conceptually, there is much overlap of TCR and 
MTT.  For example, both describe capacities of flexibly representing and reasoning about 
the relations of past and future events – capacities that contrast with simpler forms of 
time-tracking processes and capacities that draw on rather inflexible semantic or script-
like knowledge.  TCR and MTT describe capacities that are taken to underlie both past- 
and future-directed thought in symmetrical ways.  TCR, however, goes beyond MTT in 
that, apart from merely representing the relation between a (past or future) episode and 
the present, it also entails representations of temporal and causal relations between 
other episodes - in the past or in the future - that are used to make systematic and 
flexible inferences about past and future happenings.  A major characteristic of MTT has 
been argued to be the distinctive phenomenology of re- and pre-experiencing personal 
events (Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Tulving, 2005).  TCR instead has been characterized as 
a form of reasoning that is independent from subjective experience (McCormack & Hoerl, 
1999, 2008).  Because of the large overlap of the two types of cognition, and the defining 
differences between them, it is likely that they describe closely related capacities, and we 
should therefore consider possible ways of how they might work together in temporal 
reasoning tasks, like McColgan and McCormack (2008) suggested: 
Indeed, one way to think about the relationship between the two 
cognitive abilities is that MTT may deliver representations of specific past 
and future events, but frequently temporal – causal reasoning may be 
required to make use of the information given in such representations 
through a consideration of the causal connection between such events 
and other relevant events.  (p. 1494) 
TCR and temporal decentering both involve the capacity to represent and 
coordinate more than two points flexibly in time – again with the difference that TCR 
goes beyond merely representing temporal relations between events by including 
reasoning about and from temporal-causal relations.  The concept of temporal 
decentering, however, implies the necessity to mentally detach from subjective present 
perceptions.  Temporal perspective taking (understood as a combined capacity of 
decentering and the ability to represent different perspectives on the temporal relation 





other).  Work on the development of temporal language suggests that around the same 
time when TCR and MTT skills emerge, children begin to give verbal reports about their 
past and possible future experiences (Friedman, 2004; Hayne, Gross, McNamee, 
Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011).  Elsewhere, it has been argued that the use of tense in 
language production reflects developmental changes in children’s episodic memory and 
consequently changes in their self-representation (Bischof-Köhler, 2000; Perner & 
Ruffman, 1995).  Study Set 2 has shown that children also understand and differentiate 
the temporal-normative outreach of other’s temporal language.  Temporally extended 
agency is therefore a concept that young children can be accredited with.  Still, our 
studies leave open the question if children ascribe the same normative obligations that 
they infer from other’s speech acts in the same way to their own speech acts.  Similar to 
the point discussed in section 5.2, the extent to which children might evaluate other’s 
future-directed speech acts in order to adapt future-oriented behavior accordingly, it is 
unclear if they begin to reflect on their own normative obligations as early as they 
differentiate these in other’s speech acts and actions.  
Results from Study Set 1 might be interpreted as reflecting the convergence of a 
distinctive phenomenology, which is possibly similar to the one of self-projection 
described in MTT literature, with the flexible and event-independent strategy of TCR.  
Study 3, unfortunately, has left open the question of children’s flexibility in taking 
different perspectives on temporal relations, but it was designed to test for children’s 
understanding of others’ differing perspectives just as Study Sets 1 and 2 aimed to involve 
self-independent reasoning about temporal matters.  A seemingly different set of 
research questions could have focused on children’s performance in tasks that were 
exclusively self-related.  We do not know if personal experience makes a difference in 
children’s TCR or temporal-normative evaluations.  But evidence suggests this question to 
be important for our understanding of the interplay of different types of temporal 
cognition. 
Despite the massive conceptual overlap of the aspects of temporal cognition 
studied here, little research so far has systematically investigated the development of the 
different capacities in relation to each other.  The present thesis provides one step into 





of its different components in childhood.  A fundamental challenge for future research 
will be to develop appropriate measures for the specific capacities involved, and to 
systematically explore the empirical relations of these different forms and aspects of 
representing time.  
In conclusion, this work helps to improve our understanding of children’s 
developing temporal cognition in the following ways: first, previous work on children’s 
understanding of the temporal-causal relations has been replicated and extended in 
important ways.  Second, research on children’s normative understanding of the 
temporal outreach of language has been extended, proving an earlier understanding of 
different normative implications of future-directed speech acts than documented before.  
Third, a first step has been made to broaden our knowledge of - and to contribute to the 
scarce empirical evidence on - temporal perspective taking in children.  In the discussion 
and interpretation of our findings, important associations with other lines of research on 
children’s temporal cognition were revealed and an integrated and systematic 
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S2-A.  Examples of object-container pairs used in Study 2a (upper row), sorting games used in Study 2b 
(row below). 
 
S2-B.  Cards used to introduce the forced-choice paradigm in warm-up phase (left and reight pictures 









S2-C.  Script of puppet play preceding the response phases in prediction and imperative conditions in 
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